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THE DIRECTION OF PLAY

TAKEO KAJIWARA



THE ISHI PRESS

This book is a lucid exposition of the basic principles of Kajiwaras Go theory and a guide to applying these principles in your own game. Above all else, Kajiwara emphasizes the importance of careful analysis in order to determine the correct direction of play, that is, the direction in which a stone or a group of stones exerts its main influence. He demonstrates that each stone has a life of its own and so expresses the individuality of the player. The key to a powerful game is understanding the relationship between each stone and the overall position, for only then can one realize the full potential of every stone that one plays.

THE DIRECTION OF PLAY

About the Author

Takeo Kajiwarara was born in 1923 in Niigata Prefecture in Japan. He studied to under Riichi Sekiyama, 9-dan, and reached sho-dan in the autumn of 1937. His promotion to 9-dan came in 1965. In 1947 he was one of the eight professionals who left the Nihon Kiin to set up the rival Igo Shinsha organisation, but he returned the following year. In 1964 he was the challenger for the Oza title. A year later he led a delegation of go players to China.

His novel go style with its famous "drilling tactics" is highly esteemed and his sharp, intuitive flair in tactical situations is unsurpassed amongst today's professionals. With Shuko Fujisawa, 9-dan, and Toshiro Yamabe, 9-dan, he is known as one of the "three crows" (i. e. triumvirate) of the post-war generation. In 1971 he reached the final of the 8th Pro Best Ten. He also played in the 1976, 1977 and 1978 Meijin leagues and tied for 1st place in the 1977 Gosei league.

Credits

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THE DIRECTION OF PLAY

by
Takeo Kajiwarara, 9-dan

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PREFACE

I imagine the phrase "direction of play" will be new to many readers, so what does it mean?

Well, in go each stone, whether it stands alone or with others, is invested with a power all its own. Naturally, that power acts in a certain direction depending on how all the stones on the board interact. Accurately pinpointing this direction and finding the right move to match it means having a "sense of direction", an intuitive skill that is vital for real strength in the middle game.

Fuseki, joseki and tesuji are generally amenable to a more or less logical approach, but it is important to look beyond this to the inherent power that makes a stone so effective. This book is an attempt to analyse that power and the direction in which it acts. If you read it carefully I think I can safely say that you will become a much stronger go player.

Summer, 1970

Takeo Kajiwara

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INTRODUCTION

I want to emphasise right from the start that a go stone has power.

Most people think of stones simply as a means of walling off territory, an attitude that is especially common in handicap games, yet it is no exaggeration to say that so long as they think that way, they will never really improve. No, stones are something more — they are instruments of power.

Of course, as the fighting ebbs and flows these instruments of power do become the foundation for territories — go is after all a territorial game — but it is no good seeking to wall off secure territories from the very beginning. Obviously that would mean taking no account of the possible fluctuations in the fighting. As a result of these fluctuations your stones may or may not surround territory at the end of the game, irrespective of the reason they were first played, but it makes no difference, provided only that every stone has played its part and has exerted its strength to the full.

If you are the stubborn type of player who thinks that an area must be your territory because you happen to play there first, your game will suffer. It is important to realise that even if you lose an area in which you have invested several moves, there is really nothing to worry about if this is what the game as a whole requires.

It is all very well, of course, talking about stones having power, but this is an abstract concept that is not easy to define or to understand. However, I am not going to run away from the problem and say it's all a matter of intuition, nor do I expect you to pick it all up on your own.

What I will do is to take you along with me as I discuss how and why stones exert their power and how you can make the most of that power in the context of the overall game.

This power that I keep talking about is really the main theme of this book. We are not dealing with the opening, the middle game or the end game as separate topics, but simply with how to use your stones at any given time. If you do get new angles on fuseki or middle game tactics then so much the better, but remember always that we are considering most of all how to link up individual stones with the overall situation.

Right. So stones have power. But that power also acts in a certain direction (or directions). Since our main consideration will always be where to play to tap the source of power, we can call this the direction of play.

For instance, for a stone on the star point in the corner the direction of play, that is the direction in which you want to play to develop the potential of that stone, is along the sides. Stones on the 4-5 or 3-5 points imply the possibility of pressing down the opponent if he enters the corner, and so they have latent power on the outside. By contrast a stone at the 3-3 point forms a little world of its own in the corner. It is like an oasis that is blithely unaware of the desert all around.

In the case of the 3-4 point, which aims at pinching the opponent's approach stones, it is the relationship with the direction of the pincer that is important.

We can see, therefore, that even with a single stone in the corner power can be exerted in a variety of forms. Naturally groups of stones have power too, and, as will become clear from the examples in this book, they also have "directions of play".

Ultimately what go is all about is recognising the direction of play of single stones or groups of stones, and correctly choosing the next play within the framework of the game as a whole.

You mustn't play mechanically, choosing a move just because it is joseki or because it is a basic principle of fuseki. Instead you must play each stone only after considering in which directions the stones are exerting their power at that particular juncture and then trying to exploit that power (or offset it if it is working against you).

It might seem by talking this way that I am rejecting joseki or fuseki. Far from it, but in my view they too are in the end no more than special applications of the direction of play.

If you study this book carefully you will soon realise how important it is to have a "sense of direction", and gradually, as you work through the examples, you will absorb the various aspects and acquire the necessary intuition for yourself. Of course, problems of technique will crop up, but they can be regarded as being of secondary importance at this stage.

Once you can find the direction of play, that will be your signpost to improving your go strength.

CHAPTER 1

THE DIRECTION OF PLAY IN THE OPENING: THE CORNER STONES

Mention has already been made briefly in the Introduction about the direction of play from single stones in the corner, but I want to expand on this because it is very important to understand the fundamental characteristics of these stones.

When fighting is on a large scale and the battle fronts are clearly defined, there is not so much danger of missing the direction of play as there is in the very early stages of a game. In fact there is even a general tendency in fuseki to plonk down stones thoughtlessly in each of the four corners.

It may well be that you are already sowing the seeds of defeat if you play like this. And if you really want to improve it's no good arguing that you don't have to be so pedantic because you're not a professional.


Every time you place a stone on the board you are exposing something of yourself. It is not just a piece of slate, shell or plastic. You have entrusted to that stone your feelings, your individuality, your will power, and once it is played there is no going back. Each stone carries a great responsibility on your behalf.

So let us start by sorting out the right direction to play in for each of the normal opening moves.

The Star Point

Dia. 1 (The fundamental features)

As you know, a stone on the star point in the corner wants to develop in two directions, to 'a' and 'b' (in this case the letters refer not to actual points but to areas). Thus with one move you are declaring an interest in two sides. This may seem a little greedy but it is simply



Dia. 1

the result of the location of the stone on one of the major diagonals, i. e. on one of the axes of symmetry, which means that it is not biased to one side or the other.

We could perhaps say that this is something in its favour, but a stone on the star point does have a weakness, namely the three-three point, and because of this it can hardly expect any territory in the corner.

Naturally, since the stone is on the intersection of the fourth lines, there is no possibility of closing off the corner territory even with one more move.

Instead we must stress this stone's flexibility for extending its sphere of influence on a large scale by developing towards 'a' or 'b'; the precise manner of doing this, of course, depends on the opponent's moves.


When you play at the star point, therefore, you must as far as possible devise a strategy to prevent your opponent from playing around 'a' or 'b'. These are the areas where you will want to play yourself, and if you are deprived of the chance to play there, the power of your stone on the star point will be that much less.

The 3-4 Point


Dia. 1 (The fundamental features)

A stone played on the 3-4 point is a quiet, restrained move that can easily be turned into profit. The direction of the next play will be around 'a' to enclose the corner and obviously, therefore, the power of this stone is acting along the upper side.


If Black does enclose the corner with 'a' or a similar move, the next direction he will want to play in is towards 'b'. In other words, 'b' is the secondary direction from the 3-4 point.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2



Dia. 3


Dia. 2 (Pincering)

If Black encloses the corner with two stones as he does here with ▲, he might be able to utilise the influence of these stones by pincering a white approach move against his stone at the 3-4 point. One example is

Black 2 against White 1. In cases such as this, the 3-4 point is an ideal base from which to launch the pincer attack, and so we can see again that the primary direction in which to play from the 3-4 point is along the upper edge.

Dia. 3 (Profit)

If White makes a high approach move, Black can also take profit with 2 and 4. In this case the two stones in the top left-hand corner are not being utilised, but, as I said, playing at the 3-4 point is a quiet move, and so Black can be satisfied with his profit in the right-hand corner. Of course Black 2 could also be a pincer against White 1.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Not advisable)

If it is White who has the corner enclosure ▲, a play by Black at the 3-4 point, as here, would not be advisable on account of White 2. The reason for this is that Black's stone has been deprived of its direction of development and, instead, White's stones △ are simply being encouraged to develop themselves. As this diagram clearly shows, when playing the 3-4 point it is important to consider the relationship with the other corners.

The 4-5 point


Dia. 1 (The fundamental features)

From its Japanese name, "takamoku", which means "high point", it will be evident that the 4-5 point is a vantage point for outside influence. It has almost the opposite significance to the 3-4 point. I should imagine that you can easily understand that the primary direction in which a stone there is acting is (in this case) towards 'a'.


If you wanted to stress the right-hand side, you would simply play instead on the other 4-5 point, at 'b'.

Dia. 2 (outside influence)

One of Black's aims is to press White down if he enters the corner at 1 and to build up outside influence. White's contact play at 3 is a popular variation. Other lines are possible but they all usually result in an exchange of profit for thickness as here.



Dia. 1




Dia. 2

If this happens, Black's direction of play is now not only at 'a' but also, on a larger scale, the whole centre of the board, and we are talking about Black's thickness rather than influence.


Perhaps, though, we can find a better joseki to illustrate the fundamental features of the 4-5 point.

Dia. 3 (Shared profit)

In answer to White 1 Black can also play 2 and 4. With move 6 Black succeeds in getting a stone in the requisite direction, but in this case he is lacking in outside influence. It goes without saying that the decision whether to take influence or share profit depends on the overall position, but it is still clear that the direction of play from the 4-5 point is towards Black 6.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Optional)

Black can also answer White 1 on the other side at 2 and 4. After the hane at 5 there is a choice between cutting at 'a' or 'b'. You will no doubt know this already.

There is also a ladder to consider of course, and obviously the choice depends on the assessment of the game as a whole, but it should be noted that if you cut at 'b' to go for profit, you are ignoring the direction of play. Nevertheless, this can be regarded as a feature of the 4-5 point: flexibility.

The 3-5 point

Dia. 1 (The fundamental features)


The main feature of a stone at the 3-5 point is that it is very resourceful. There is no doubt that the direction it will be aiming at is towards 'a', but if Black makes a corner enclosure at 'b' the direction of play switches to 'c'.

Another reason for describing a stone at the 3-5 point as resourceful is that, if White enters the corner at 'b', there are so many possible variations for Black to choose from. White might not play 'b', but might choose 'd' instead. Then Black can opt for profit by switching to 'b', and he won't complain.


Dia. 2 (Calm)

If White approaches at 1 it is possible for Black simply to extend to 2 to see how White will proceed.

Naturally, the relationship with the left side also has to be considered, but this diagram shows in the plainest possible fashion that the direction of play from the 3-5 point is towards Black 2.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2

Dia. 3 (Pressing down)


Black can also press White down with 2 and 4 if he wishes to place emphasis on thickness towards the centre. This is a well known joseki, but it does have

the drawback of giving secure profit to White. Of course, once Black has, as it were, invested so much capital, he must get a stone at 'a' to reap his reward.


Anyway, the main point is that the direction of play from the 3-5 point is towards 'a'.

Dia. 4 ("The 100 variations of taisha")


Despite what was just said, Black can also answer White's approach at 1 with Black 2, which triggers off the "hundred variations of taisha". In this case the subsequent functions of the stones and the directions of play depend on White's replies and cannot be predicted.



Dia. 3



Dia. 4



Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (Attack from the side)

Depending on the state of the game Black can attack on the other side at 2. In this case the direction of play changes to 'a'.

It is thus a basic feature of a stone at the 3-5 point that it is very flexible, that is, able to move in various ways to match the course of the game. Primarily, however, the direction of play is along the upper edge.


The 3-3 point

Dia. 1 (The fundamental features)


A stone at the 3-3 point, like a stone on the star point, constitutes in itself a complete method of handling the corner, but it has directly opposite connotations. In other words, although the 3-3 point, like the star point, is on a major diagonal, there is a major difference between the two. In fact, there is no direction of play from the 3-3 point.

The real significance of a play at the 3-3 point is that it disposes of the corner. Clearly, through being on the intersection of the third lines, it has the highest possible degree of security, and this is something in its favour. But at the same time this can be a drawback. As it is so low, there is no way of developing properly from it with another move.

This then is the main feature of the 3-3 point: it forms a world of its own and has no stake in outside influence.



Dia. 1



Dia. 2


Dia. 2 (Pressure from above)

Not only does a stone at the 3-3 point have no stake in outside influence, but White 1 forces it into an even lower position. The sequence from Black 2 to White 5 is a joseki. Although Black gets a low position, his profit is never small and his base is secure. This is his compensation.

Dia. 3 (Confrontation)

From White's point of view, if he has a corner enclosure such as $\triangle$, he can confront Black with 1, which expects Black 2, and then White 3 is one way of developing the potential power of the stones marked $\triangle$.

To summarize, a stone at the 3-3 point is more stable than one anywhere else, but it has the defect of having no real direction of development.



Dia. 3


Corner enclosures

Corner enclosures have already been mentioned in passing, but a little more needs to be said.

Dia. 1 (The direction of play)

Up to now we have dealt with single stones but the same principles apply to groups.

The primary direction of play from a corner enclosure, the "front door", as it is called, is towards 'a'. The "back door", 'b', is the secondary direction.




Dia. 1

Dia. 2 (A box or a tray)

The reasoning behind what was just said, is that by playing at 'a', and then 'b', from the corner enclosure (the one shown is not the only one possible of course), a box-like shape results.

Playing at 'c', and then 'd' gives, in contrast, something that looks more like a tray than a box, and so this is the secondary direction. The superiority of a box to a tray in mapping out territory is what determines the direction of play from a corner enclosure.



Dia. 2

CHAPTER 2

THE EARLY STAGES ARE DECISIVE

A fundamental truth

The above has been no more than a re-statement, from the viewpoint of the direction of play, of some of the basic principles of the opening. The reason I bothered to do this is to underline how this concept of the power of a stone applies even from the very start of a game. This is a fundamental truth, and one which you must master if you really want to improve.

There are people who think that it makes little difference how they play in the opening. Ridiculous! A game is often decided in the opening.

Now it is not the aim of this book to go into the opening as such, but obviously problems to do with the direction of play occur even at the very beginning of a game. If you like, you can consider a whole game as one on-going direction-of-play problem and the "opening" as merely an artificial concept, but perhaps that's too much of an exaggeration.




Figure 1 (1 - 4)


Fig. 1 Star Point Opening

We have already dealt with single stones in a corner. Let us see now how they relate to a full game. We shall use as a basis a typical game between two amateur 2-dans and we shall see how typical amateurs stress or (more likely) disregard the direction of play.

This game started with Black playing 1 at the star point. As soon as he played this move, the nature of the game was more or less decided. In other words, Black now wants to develop along the sides from this stone and the subsequent manoeuvring must take account of this.

Black answered White's first move at the 3-4 point by taking another star point with 3. This was correct. You might think such a comment is nonsensical at this stage of the game, but it's not. Black 3 is good not just because it makes the position known as *nirensai* (occupation of two star points on one side of the board), but also because it takes account of White 2. How?

This is where your sense of direction comes in, even this early in the game. Disregarding White 4 for the moment, see if you can say where the next move should be.



Dia. 1


Direction Of The Approach Move

Dia. 1 (Excellent)

Black 1 is the right move and it is this that makes Black ▲ correct.

The power of ▲ is being exerted in the direction of 'a'. Obviously Black can also develop towards 'b', which would give *sanrensei* (three star points on one side), but the real value of Black 1 is that it combines a corner play with development towards 'a'.

As an experiment try setting up this position on a go board. Although the value of Black 1 might be difficult to appreciate in a book, I am sure it will hit you as you actually touch the stones. The stone ▲ comes alive when it is backed up by Black 1 and, together with his stone in the top right-hand corner, Black is deploy-



Dia. 2


ing his forces on a grand scale all round the board. Excellent! It is important to have that kind of approach to go.

Dia. 2 (Continuation)

White's contact play 2 in answer to Black 1 is a joseki that emphasises profit. The moves up to 7 then follow naturally. If White encloses the corner at 8, Black extends to 9 and the game is over.

Obviously that's an exaggeration, but White's forces are overconcentrated on one side of the board, whereas Black has taken control of the fourth line in a big way. This gives him such outside influence that it is hard to see how White's profit can match it.

If, after this, Black gets the *sanrensei* position with 'a', the game really will be over.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3 (Severe pincer)

White therefore has to find some means of stopping the sanrensei, but when he approaches at 1, although Black's usual reply is at 'a', in this case the black stone ▲ is just begging to be used. Whenever a stone on a star point cries out to be used like this you must always heed the cry.

Black 2 is therefore an excellent move. It relates both to the left side and to the two stones on the star points on the right-hand side. In other words it shows a good sense of direction.

The strategic positioning of the black stones to right and left emphasises power, or influence, and the proper approach is to play so as to activate that power.

Pincering White 1 is joseki, but it is important not to play the pincer simply because it is joseki. Rather, your move should take into account the overall position.



Dia. 4

Necessity comes first. If a joseki happens to result from that, then all well and good.


Dia. 4 (Outside influence)

White's invasion at the 3-3 point is a common response to Black's one-space pincer. Naturally Black blocks at 2 and the result up to 6 is a joseki.

The end product is perfect outside influence for Black. Even the black stone ▲ away over on the right-hand side seems to contribute to Black's territorial framework.

We could even say, perhaps, that this game is as good as over. This is merely an assessment of the prospects, but you should strive to acquire the attitude to make such a stern assessment yourself.

In this position two correct josekis have been played and together they have formed a fuseki. So why has White ended up at such a grave disadvantage? That question deserves a lot of thought.



Dia. 5


Dia. 5 (Direction of play)

As you will have understood by now, Black's approach move at 1 is a powerful back-up to ▲, but that is not the real reason why White ends up at a disadvantage in the previous diagram. It was because he thought about nothing but profit, whereas Black stressed outside influence consistently by combining his approach move 1 with his stones on the star points.

In addition to this, though, there is a cause and effect relationship in go whereby taking profit gives the opponent outside influence, so that White was multiplying Black's own efforts.

In answer to Black 1, therefore, White must consider offsetting the power of ▲ by pincering with White 2.

If you play as your opponent dictates, you cannot expect any good to come of it. Your thoughts must be directed towards avoiding such submissiveness.



Dia. 6

From the point of view of the direction of play, destroying the opponent's outside influence is more sensible than profit-grabbing.


Dia. 6 (Strange feeling)

Nevertheless, after White's pincer the game is not easy for either player.


Black's diagonal play at 1 is best. Dodging away with White 2 is pausable, and then if Black hems in the corner stone, White will ignore this and seal off another corner at 4. If Black halts White's expansion on the left side with 5, White takes the extension at 6.

This is an apparently acceptable game, but when all is said and done, many people may have the feeling that something has gone wrong.

Surely the joseki is alright, you might say, but that's not the point. If play flows smoothly in the correct order and with due regard to the prevailing circumstances, then josekis are irrelevant.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 6. (Joseki)

The first move that might come to mind in answer to White's pincer at 1 is Black 2, which leads to a popular joseki. At this stage we are really leaving the rather abstract domain of the direction of play and are setting foot in the realms of technique, but there is an important point here. Although I referred to technique as a secondary matter above, some common sense is necessary.

Of course, the basis of the problem is that White's replies are not yet known so that it is impossible to predict what will happen.


Dia. 8 (Good for White)

The sequence up to White 15 is a joseki. This is a well known joseki, so there is no need to dwell on it, but the result is that White gets a thick wall with 13 and 15 and this offsets the power of ▲.

This is good for White and is obviously out of the question for Black.

Dia. 9 (A fighting joseki – good for Black)

Therefore, if White starts off with the joseki of Dia. 8,




Dia. 9

Black would probably choose the variation where he bends round at 12. White 13 instead of the connection at 17 is necessary because the ladder then resulting from White 22 after Black 18 and 15 does not work – ▲ in the top right-hand corner breaks the ladder. In other words, to play this variation Black must have a ladder breaker available.

So White 13 is inevitable here, and both Black 14 and White 15 are forced too. After Black 16 there is a variation in which White pushes through at 22 and trades territory on the right for Black territory on the left, but obviously that would be bad for him in this case. Hence the sequence up to Black 26.

Incidentally, Black does not play at 'a' to settle the situation here because it is not necessary. It will only become necessary when the fighting in the centre starts. You have no doubt realised that Black can relish looking forward to any fight in the centre since his stones on the star points will then be highly effective.



Dia. 10


Dia. 10 (50% difference)

There is another joseki that White can choose. This is the one where he plays atari underneath at 6. In this variation he goes entirely for profit but, as has already been said, it is not really wise for White to attach too much importance to territory in this kind of opening.

Once Black connects at 7 the rest of the sequence follows automatically and Black gets powerful thickness to back up his approach at 17.

Locally the result of this joseki is even. White has pure profit. We can mark him 100% for this. Black thickness is also worth full marks but he gets another 50% for his approach move at 17 which works *with* his thickness. This again shows that it is not so good for White to concentrate on profit.

It is true that the power of ▲ in the top left-hand corner has been weakened by White's thrust at 14, but Black can't have everything.



Dia. 11

Dia. 11 (Correct)


We can conclude from the above that the hane inside Black's contact play at 1 is not an appropriate move in this game. The hane outside at 2 is the right direction of play.

Black's diagonal play at 5 is forced, but White lightly dodges away to 6. This is correct because it offsets the power of ▲.


Dia. 12 (Go theory)

Careful thought will show, however, that Black's contact play at 'a' is not even necessary. It merely serves to give White good shape.


Simply Black 1, to which White 2 is an unavoidable response, followed by Black 3, limiting the action of ▲, is more in tune with go theory.




Dia. 12



Dia. 13



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Dia. 13 (Optimistic)

Leaving aside the pros and cons of Black ▲, White 1 is the wrong kind of move here. It helps White △, but if it is played with the idea of attacking the black group below, White is being too optimistic.

Black 2 is White's weak point and White has to play 3 and 5 to give his group some scope for development. This gives Black the opportunity to take over the attack with 6, and now his star-point stone ■ is working well. Bearing in mind that Black 'a' is a forcing move, this position is intolerable for White.

Dia. 14 (Logical)


If White already has a stone at △, then his attack with White 1 is logical and in the right direction. Distinguish carefully between these last two positions.

Dia. 15 (Natural flow)

Our discussion has led us to the conclusion that play might proceed up to White 7. These move flow naturally and there is nothing odd about them.

Black has adopted a policy of trying to activate his stones on the star points, which were the foundation of his opening strategy, and White has been trying to oppose this. This cut and thrust is what real go is about — I call it "living go".

Black might prefer to play 6 at 7, and then White would play at 'a', but that would lead to a different game. In the diagram White has a nice position in the lower right corner, but that's all. With this Black 6 the stone ▲ comes alive, and Black can be well satisfied.



Dia. 16

Dia. 16 (Light territory)


White can develop easily on the left side with 2 even if Black invades at 1. I have coined a phrase to describe the flexible, half-influence, half-territory kind of position White has here – it is a “light territory”. White’s position is inferior on this side but that is only to be expected in view of his strength in the lower right. This is what we refer to as “balance”.

Now the problem in the lower left corner.


Dia. 17 (White can live)

If White attaches at 1 he can live. Black 2 to White 7 follow, and White has some potential left at ‘a’ and ‘b’, but the time to play this has to be chosen very carefully, because it also strengthens Black on the outside.

Even so, △ is in a reasonable position in that it is not too close to Black’s thickness. This demonstrates the soundness of White’s move.



Dia. 17



Dia. 18

Dia. 18 (Forcing move)

If it is Black’s turn to play he can play 1 to capture △ completely, but White still has a forcing move at 2, which threatens ‘a’, etc.

The main point is that White is justified in playing △ and treating it lightly, because it takes account of Black’s fuseki which stresses influence.

Going back to Fig. 1, it may have surprised you that so much lay beneath the surface of those four moves Black 1 to White 4, but that’s the way it is.

The various factors considered all stemmed from Black’s choice of a star-point opening and then the direction of play as determined by White’s play at the 3-4 point.

Leaving all that behind, let us move on to Fig. 2. You may have guessed by now that Black actually played somewhere else on move 5.




Figure 2 (5 – 11)

Fig. 2. No sense of direction


Black chose an approach move in the bottom right corner. Of course that's no good. Even considering the lower edge alone he is outnumbered two to one and White will have the advantage in any fighting here. As we have already said, he should have played at 11 so that he could call on the support of his stone at ▲.

Black 5 has no sense of direction. The cry of the star-point stone has not been heeded.

White's two-space pincer 6 and the sequence up to 10 form a popular joseki, but Black has let his stone in the top right be kicked in the teeth with White 10.

Black 11 finally does come, but oh so late. If only his poor stones could speak to let him know.

The most distasteful aspect of Fig. 2 is the belief in the sanctity of joseki. This is a deep-rooted fault among amateurs and so drastic surgery is needed.




Dia. 19

First of all, White 6 and so on is a joseki. However, that must not lead to complacency and trap us into forgetting the overall game. The fact that White 10 upsets Black's star-point stone so much should be warning enough of the pitfalls that lie in store.

I have almost personified the stones so far in this book, and it is rather nice to think of stones having feelings. Looking at things that way there is one thing you must remember: never upset your star-point stones.

Dia. 19 (Smiling stones)

Countering White's two-space pincer 1 with the counter-pincer Black 2 is best. Then, after White 9, Black can extend to 10 and now his ▲ is smiling. This is a local tactic, however, and should not be used straightaway as it makes White thick and is gote for Black.



Dia. 20


Dia. 20 (Think of playing elsewhere)

There is no need to answer White 1 straightaway. Although Black moved in the wrong direction by playing in the bottom right-hand corner, it is not too late for Black, if he is paying attention, to switch back to 2.

If White now attacks at 'a', Black will nonchalantly press at 'b' and go his own way with a strong feeling of satisfaction.

The point is, if Black immediately answers White 1 by playing the usual joseki, he is clearly disregarding the direction of play.

Settling the lower right corner also makes Black's moves in the lower left corner that much more difficult (this rather complicated point will be explained later) and Black should switch to 2 anyway to see what White's reply will be.




Dia. 21

Dia. 21 (The left side is most important)

Let us try shifting White's pincer stone to the left side, at 2. This move obstructs the direction in which ▲ wants to develop and also defends against the approach at 'a'. This is what White should play, killing two birds with one stone.

What do you think?

After White 2 it goes without saying that White will aim next at the pincer 'b', although it is not clear what will happen in the lower right corner because Black can play there first. Even so, White must be happy with the windfall of 2.



Dia. 22


Dia. 22 (A mistake)

This White 1 is on the correct side of the board, but it is a bad move. Black can now develop at 2 and ▲ is smiling again.

White does have the pincer at 'a' next, but this leaves him overconcentrated on the lower edge. Just compare Black's expansive fuseki.

Usually a corner enclosure is something to be pleased about, but you must always be ready to adapt to changing circumstances. With every single move that is played the position changes completely, even if on the surface this is not always readily apparent.

In this particular opening the black stone ▲ in the top left corner has a major role and because of this the direction of play, i. e. the place to play, is on the left side.



Dia. 23

Dia. 23 (Very flexible)

White 1 offsets the power of ▲ and therefore cannot claim the corner as well, but it has a great deal of flexibility with respect to the corner. For instance, if Black comes in at 2, White attacks at 3, which then allows him to aim at the pincer 'a'.

Such moves obviously depend on the circumstances and we cannot say that they are always good. Future plays have to be considered as well.

In the Figure both players forgot about the left side and swapped moves in the lower right corner: both disregarded the direction of play. And now, because the position in the lower right corner has been decided, the situation is very different.




Figure 3 (12 - 17)


When the wind changes ...


Fig. 3 Just joseki

White chose another joseki with 12, but just as Black did in the right-hand corner he is putting on a joseki-only face.

On the right side White $\triangle$ brought sorrow to Black's star-point stone above, but in the left hand corner White went for profit and thus allowed Black to build up a framework with 17, much to the delight of the star-point stone in the top left-hand corner. This tragedy is merely the direct result of ignoring the directions of play.

So how should White have played on move 12?





Dia. 25

Dia. 25 (Honour saved)


The two-space high pincer is popularly likened to Muramasa's swords, which had a reputation for blood-thirstiness and ill-luck, but the analogy is based on the numerous danger-ridden variations rather than on anything to do with cutting.

The pincer stone is somewhat remote and is not attacking Black too severely, which gives it a feeling of balance.

Black 2 is one variation.

After White 3 to Black 6, White 7 is one joseki. It is not clear how Black will proceed, but obviously $\triangle$ is supporting White's thickness and is playing a very useful role.

Against this White 1 is rather isolated. However, it is on the fourth line and can easily run away, so it is not much of a burden. The notion of balance comes out clearly here.



Dia. 26

Dia. 26 (Shoe on the other foot)


Let us see why a narrower pincer is not so good for White 1.

White can answer Black 2 by dodging away lightly to 3, but then Black seals off the corner with 4. This pattern occurred in Dia. 6 on page 25 but in that case the surrounding situation was very different.

Because of the stone at Black 4, the direction in which White $\triangle$ wants to develop has been blocked and now the shoe is on the other foot for White.

Treating $\triangle$ lightly on the assumption that it has already fulfilled its role in settling the right side is sometimes a good idea, but not in this instance. The very solidness of the black groups to left and right is too overpowering.

In this situation it is the lower edge that demands priority.



Dia. 27

Dia. 27 (Difficult)


Consequently, it seems that White 3 is a necessary reply to Black 2 in order to save the honour of ▲.

If you play on one side, however, you can't play on the other — that's just a fact of life — and after Black presses at 4, he can continue pressing at 6 if White extends to 5. Things then become rather difficult for White on the left side.

In this case Black would be able to call upon the services of ▲ and his advantage in any fighting on this side is crystal clear.

In short, the narrow pincer is a mistake.

As a game progresses and stones accumulate on the board, various directions of play emerge. It is important to choose the right one. Herein lie the difficulty and the charm of go, but as long as your attitude is: "Ah, that's joseki so I'm alright", you will never be able to savour that charm.



Dia. 28

The sequence played in the actual game in the two bottom corners were book-moves, played without thought and quite without relevance to the function of the stones already on the board.

I am being extremely critical of this typical amateur game, but my intention is merely to get you out of the straitjacket attitude I have described.

The quickest way to improve is to consider the stones already on the board. Have I convinced you yet?

Dia. 23 (White in trouble)

Continuing from the previous diagram, White can resist with 1 and 3 but then Black 4 is a strong move and White is in trouble. He may be able to live — just — but it is easy to see how Black ▲ has played its part.

As Black lots of players would have chosen to settle the position with something like Black 'a' first, but this is not good. Any unnecessary move is a bad move.




Figure 4 (18 – 24)

The direction of play

Fig. 4 Entering the middle game


Black has come off worse in the lower right corner because he allowed White to occupy Δ , ruining the prospects of the star-point stone above.

In the other bottom corner it was White who came off worse: he let Black make a framework with $\blacktriangle$ to exploit fully his other star-point stone.

Cancelling out these losses we can see that both players are entering the middle game still on level terms.

The surging power of White's approach move 18 is all due to the presence of Δ and it really rubs in Black's loss in this corner.

Black pincer at 19 but straightaway White jumped to 20 and was then able to approach at 22. Already the game has become difficult for Black.



Dia. 29


Black 23 is a reasonable move, but White 24 is strange. Although the middle game has begun, let us analyse this figure from the viewpoint of the direction of play.

Dia. 29 (Another approach move)

If White approaches at 1 so as to break up Black's territorial framework on the left, Black should play below it at 2. The usual one-space answer on the other side would be inferior because it would be too close to Black's own thickness.

White dodges away to 3, aiming next at an invasion at 'a'. This White 3 is correct. If it is at 'b', Black will stretch to 'c' and White will be under severe attack. This point merits careful consideration.

At the heart of Black 2 is the realisation that White Δ is already there, and although Black's way of playing is slightly unusual, he is on the right track because he is taking account of Δ .




Dia. 30

Dia. 30 (No good)

Black's pincer at 2 was said to be correct on a previous occasion (Dia. 3, page 22), but here the overall position is different and it is no longer a good move. The reason is that, after Black 8, it is obvious that White will immediately extend to 9. Black cannot expect as much from his framework here as he could in Dia. 4. In fact, White's territorial framework looks appreciably more promising. There is also the point the Black cannot risk attempting to block White in on the upper edge after White 'a'.

In other words, because of $\triangle$, it is important for Black to change his ideas and put greater emphasis on actual territory. This is generally referred to as "proper application of joseki". I prefer to think of it as a natural concept deriving from the direction of play, not just locally but over the whole board.



Dia. 31


Adapting ideas to meet changing circumstances leads to "living go"

Dia. 31 (A wider pincer is best)

White actually played at 1, a natural enough move considering the presence of $\triangle$. Go theory tells us to push the opponent in the direction of our thickness and, therefore, to approach from the side opposite to thickness.

Obviously, Black should also keep away from White's thickness and Black's idea of counterattacking with a pincer and looking for a way of handling the corner lightly was correct. Unfortunately he chose the wrong move.

He should have made the pincer one space wider with 2, thus linking up with the left-hand corner.



Dia. 32


Dia. 32 (A welcome trade)

It often happens that we get the right direction of play but the wrong move. Black 19 in Fig. 4 is an example of this.

White was then able to play 20 and so on, but if Black had pincer at ▲, it would have been too much of a crush for White to play that way. Under those circumstances he might have taken the corner with 3.

In all probability Black expected White to play this whether he played at ▲ or 'a'. He was far too complacent.

Black would be very happy to trade territory for thickness in this corner, because White 11 overlaps to a certain extent with ▲, thus making White overconcentrated on the right, and Black's territorial framework is enormous. However, Black played at 'a' and this didn't happen.



Dia. 33


White took full advantage of the one-line difference and played as in the Figure. Black's predicament stems from his poor sense of direction but it's all his own fault. White seems to have pulled ahead.

Dia. 33 (Attack)

The basic reason Black's wider pincer at ▲ is best is that it develops the strength of all three star-point stones by uniting them.

White will now find it hard to approach at 1. Black's standard contact-and-extend manoeuvre leaves White under attack by ▲.

One space can make a big difference.



Dia. 34

Dia. 34 (Invasion)

This diagram is given as comment on White 24 in Fig. 4. The middle game has already begun and we are already entering the realms of technique, but the direction of play must still be considered for every move.

This White 1, invading at the three-three point, is a good move, Black has to answer at 2 and White 3 makes a nice territory.


If Black 4 and 6, etc. build up thickness towards the centre, White makes a base for his group with 9 and 11. This virtually forces Black 12 and then White can erase Black's framework from a safe distance at 13.

This white stone has no need to worry about being captured, and as White already has more secure territory, his prospects are distinctly favourable.

All this has been the result of the one-space difference in Black ▲.

Dia. 35 (Pressing)

In the game White played ▲, but then Black had a good move available at 1. If White jumps back with something like 2, Black can attack at 3 and perhaps seal White in. This is the problem with ▲.




Dia. 35

Dia. 36 (An interesting idea)

The simplest thing for White to do is to invade at 'a', but if he insists on playing on the side he should try the interesting-looking White 1.

Since White always has the invasion at 'a' in reserve, he has nothing to fear from Black barging in between his two stones. Moreover, the threat of White 'b' next is very powerful.

Anyway, these are mainly problems of technique, so I am not going to go into them.



Dia. 36




Figure 5 (25 - 44)

CHAPTER 3

Fig. 5 White probably wins

There is nothing special to say about the moves in this figure, but by move 44 it looks as if White will win. However, the actual result is not important. What *is* important is that Black chose a star-point opening yet disregarded the direction of play of his star-point stones, and in this way stumbled into failure.

The star stone in the top right was weakened by the joseki in the bottom right corner and later on Black's pincer ▲ overlooked the relationship with the top left corner, and so Black got into a hard fight. Even so, it cannot be denied that White also had a poor joseki in the bottom left-hand corner.

By now you should be appreciating the importance of the direction of play in the opening. Let us, therefore, take one more opening in the next chapter and put this new knowledge on a firm footing.

MOVE TWO LOST THE GAME

The Relationship Between The First Two Moves

A certain professional go player, carefully scrutinising one of his own games, once remarked with a sigh: "Ah, move two lost me the game."

To the kind of person who sees no logical way that the second move can lose a whole game, this probably sounds like a tall story. I can't actually vouch for its veracity, but considering the severe attitude that pros adopt towards their own games, it seems quite plausible.

Provided that you don't do something ridiculous and that you stick to moves on the third or fourth line in the corners, there is no way that Black 1 can ever be a losing move. But for White 2 things are different. This is because of the direction in which the power of Black 1 is acting. This stone is already on the board, so White has to take it into account. It is from this instant that the fighting starts.

There is a subtle relationship between the first two moves. Let us look at this relationship through another game between amateur 2-dans. This game is full of subtle nuances.




Figure 1 (1 - 2)

Fig. 1 *Stones have eyes*

Go stones are round and have neither a head nor tail, but once they are placed on the board they acquire a face with open eyes. These eyes are firmly fixed in the "direction of play". Your first priority must be to discover what direction that is.

Black 1 in this game was again on a star-point. White 2 at komoku was a dubious play. This move epitomises the irresponsible attitude of “it doesn’t matter where you play in the opening.” Yet White 2 is probably a losing move. Anyone who can’t believe this should read the next section very carefully.




Figure 2 (3 - 5)

Fig. 2 Wrong point

The reason White 2 is bad is that Black ▲ is on a star-point.


Because of this, Black 'a', which approaches in the direction of development of ▲, becomes a perfect play.

A little thought should be enough to discover where Black ought to play next. In fact Black actually played in the top left-hand corner at 3.

He has let slip a golden opportunity. In itself Black 3 is a good move along the top edge, but it ignores the relationship of the star stone with the bottom right-hand corner.

White's high approach at 4 is alright, but for the life of me I can't see why Black played 5 at the 3-5 point.

The discussion so far has been rather like one of those enigmatic Zen riddles, and the reader may well be lost, so let us get down to some detailed explanations.



Dia. 1


Dia. 1 (Nowhere to play)

In spite of Black's occupation of the star point with ▲, White played at △. This is very bad.

Black can play 1 at takamoku and if White takes the last empty corner with 2, Black makes a high approach at 3. White then has virtually nowhere to play that doesn't help Black.

Black's twin salients radiating from ▲ control the centre because of their high position. You must learn to appreciate that this is a very desirable position.

And that is why White 2 (△) was a losing move. Perhaps that's going too far or is it?



Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (Perfect play)

Since this diagram is so important in talking about a sense of direction, it is given again. If you can, set up this position on a board and see how directly the stones transmit their feelings.

If Black ▲ is on a star point and White △ is facing it at the 3-4 point, Black 1 on the 4-5 point in the top left corner is a perfect play. It implies a black approach at 'a' next, and gives Black a very pleasant feeling that he is going to control the centre of the board in a big way.


If White goes to the bottom left corner, Black will naturally play at 'a'. No doubt you can see that it is then difficult for White to come in at 'b'.

On the other hand, If White encloses the bottom right corner at 'a', Black gets first move in a third corner with 'c'.

Given the relationship of ▲ and △, Black 1 at the 4-5 point is perfect, and no other moves should be considered.

If Black does play at the 4-5 point, White 2 becomes a losing move.

Perhaps you balk at this kind of assessment, but if you really want to develop your go powers you must be prepared to think in this way.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3 (To edge only)

As it turned out though, Black actually played at 1.

Of course if White approaches at 2, Black will pincer at 3 and make his stone ▲ very effective. However, good as this may be in itself, it is thinking only of the top edge.

If, on the other hand, White's stone in the bottom right corner is facing the other way at △, this Black 1 is then the best he can do.

Accordingly White △ in this diagram is correct and no longer is White 2 a losing move.



Dia. 4


Dia. 4 (Consistent policy)

Since Black did not play at the 4-5 point, the high approach 1 was a shrewd move by White. This move is good because it deprives Black of the direction of play of his stone ▲.

Striving to offset the power of the opponent's stones like this is the essence of opening play for White, and Black has to adapt to the changing situation.

Now although Black 2 is late, it is high and Black can still aim at 'a' next. This is consistent with the policy behind ▲.

The difference between this and the previous diagram is that Black's plans are one step behind. White has been able to get in a spoiling move at 1, but at least Black is now being consistent with the reason he played ▲ in the first place.




Dia. 5


Dia. 5 (Good flow)

If we assume that ▲ implies an approach move by Black in the bottom right-hand corner backed up by the star stone, White is likely to defend against this by enclosing the corner with, say, 1. Whereupon Black takes the empty corner and gets the advantage of first move in three corners. His stones are flowing well.

Black can also attack at 'a' instead of 2, but Black 1 in Dia. 6 is poor. The move in the empty corner has to be at the 4-5 point; the 3-4 point is no good because it is an open invitation to White 2, which is perfectly supported by the enclosure in the opposite corner. Make sure you realise why Black 1 is bad.



Dia. 6



Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (Clever fighting)

Black's pincer at 'a' was the obvious move, but Black can also approach straightaway at 1. This move too brings ▲ to life.

White would probably answer by pressing at 2. There are lots of little nuances involved here requiring intelligent decisions. For instance, if White responds directly to Black 1, ▲ will develop its power even further, and if Black answers White 2, White will become thick and this will offset the power of ▲.

In other words, the crux of this game is that Black has a stone ▲ on a star point and its power radiates out from that corner.

It should therefore be clear why Black plays high in the empty corner. While claiming the advantage of playing first here, he has to play high to assert the power of ▲ and to aim at controlling the centre. As for the top left-hand corner, depending on what follows Black can consider abandoning it altogether.




Figure (1 - 5)

Fluctuating Game

Repeat Figure (Just five moves)

Black 1 to 5 — just five moves. Yet how this game has fluctuated already.

White 2 was in the wrong direction in relation to Black 1 and was perhaps a losing move. Black 3 did not take advantage of White's mistake. Black 5 was also in the wrong direction. Both players have been guilty of a poor sense of direction.

This is something I really want you to appreciate, by studying all these moves again.




Figure 3 (6 - 11)

Fig. 3 Wrong Direction


White approached straightaway at 6, but this was not the urgent point. Simply pressing at White 10 is correct.

White 6 loses territory by provoking Black 7 and 9 and he loses the chance of perhaps playing at 7 later if the game warrants this. But certainly there is no need to settle this area yet.

Perhaps White played 6 and 8 because these are outward-facing moves like 10, but by themselves 6 and 8 are just a ramshackle structure. Giving Black profit in return for such paltry strength must clearly be bad policy.

Then Black pincered at 11. This, like White 6, shows a poor sense of direction. First of all, it is a basic tenet of go theory that it is a waste of time playing a low pincer in an area with an open skirt (i. e. open at the side); that is, Black can jump in from 9 anyway.

White's two stones are not exactly light but he will find it easy to manage this group, and once it has escaped Black 11 will have no meaning. In other words, Black 11 will be left reducing an area that was never going to be white territory anyway. Furthermore, this stone has no relationship with the stone in the top left corner. In short Black has committed the dreaded sin of playing on a valueless point.



Dia. 8

Dia. 8 (Tight play)

Black has only to defend tightly at 1. After this the game will soon be in his favour. Since a pincer now really would be severe, White has to defend at 2, thus giving Black a golden opportunity to fix up the upper corner with 3. All of White's play then suddenly seems to have been deficient.

White 10 was in the right direction, but it has lost its effect because of the sequence that settled the lower left corner.




Figure 4 (12 - 20)

The Direction Of The Fighting

Fig. 4 The Essence Of Close Fighting

We have entered the middle game. From now on finding the direction of play will become more and more difficult. The cap at White 12 was a good move.


Dia. 9 (The Aim)

After the cap White can aim at 1 and it becomes evident that ▲ is in the wrong place. For attacking purposes ▲ should have been high at 'a'. As it stands ▲ is no more than an erasing move attempting to exploit an open skirt, but of course an erasing move has no real force behind it.

As an answer to Black 13, White 14 again betrays a lack of directional sense. The theatre of operations now should be the centre of the board.

Dia. 10 (Correct)


Pressing at White 1 is the correct move. After this it is difficult for Black to get into the centre.




Dia. 9

Dia. 11 (Outside influence)


If Black continues with 2, etc., White need have no compunction about letting him connect along the edge. White 7 next develops on a large scale and he is set to dominate the board with his outside influence.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Dia. 13

At this stage individual groups are displaying a directionality of their own. We are already into some close fighting and there is no time to omit a single move.

Dia. 12 (Wrong direction)


White $\triangle$ rushes for territory but forgets about the fighting going on. If only Black were to press at 1 he would seize the initiative in the fight and the game would tilt back in his favour.

Since the purpose of playing at $\triangle$ was to aim at 1, Black should have played here at once, especially as White gave him such a good chance.

Dia. 13 (Way off the mark)

However, Black chose to switch to the lower right corner with 1, which brings us back to Black 15 in the figure. Of course White should now chase Black with 2, which would justify $\triangle$. If Black omits the connection at 'a', White will play there and the game will be over.

With 16 and so on both players blithely trot out another joseki. Far from showing any sense of direction, these moves suggest an attitude of playing joseki to take the easy way out. With that kind of attitude you will never win a fight at close quarters. A game where all the stones are pointing in the wrong direction is just rubbish.



Dia. 14

Dia. 14 (If only ...)

If there had to be a joseki in the right-hand corner, at least White should have chosen the variation at 4, so as to be able to go right up to 6 (this threatens a blockade at 'a'). Of course White 2 should have been at 'b' anyway.




Figure 5 (21 - 26)

A Discussion of Potential


Fig. 5 The Potential of One Move

Black 21 is a joseki when Black chooses to sacrifice ▲, but settling the situation with 23 is very bad. Then, by making too narrow an extension to 25, Black lets White launch a severe attack at 26.

Dia. 15 (Leaving potential)

Black should simply play at 1 in the corner, then make a broad extension to 3, giving this position some sort of relationship with the star stone ▲. The point is that if Black leaves the corner as it is, he can use 'a' as a forcing move should he need to find life on the edge. This is a big difference compared to the game, where 'a' is no longer effective. This one move may prove significant later.


It is wrong to assume that you should play such moves because they are sente – an unnecessary move is in fact a bad move.




Dia. 15

Dia. 16 (Counterattack)

Once Black has made an extension as wide as 3, it is natural that he should worry about the counter White 4 and 6. However, if Black desists from playing 'a' he has nothing to worry about. The following diagrams show why.




Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Dia. 17 (Inevitable)

Following on from the previous diagram, after Black cuts at 1 the capture at 3 is inevitable. White cuts at 4 then of course the ladder works after 6, and in itself this exchange can be regarded as a success for White, but there is salvation for Black if he has not played at 'a'.



Dia. 18


Dia. 18 (All or nothing)

Black 1 is a forcing move (of course this provokes White's capture and it is regrettable that it weakens ▲ but the local fight is the overriding concern here and this loss just has to be accepted) then 3 brings the corner stone back to life. The benefit of omitting 'a' is quite apparent here.

White cannot prevent the connection.

Dia. 19 (Useless)

If White tries 4, Black plays 5, and White's attempt to disconnect him fails with the moves up to 7. Now the white corner group has lost its base and can be severely attacked.




Dia. 19

Dia. 20 (Loss of potential)

Now assuming Black were to exchange 1 for 2, a push by Black at 'a' subsequently will have virtually no effect because the 1-2 exchange has already made White safe. Thus a single move can radically alter the future possibilities; it should not be played just because it is sente.

Black 23 in Figure 5 is bad, not only because it removes his potential here, but also because 23 and 25 make the Black group heavy and open to White's severe counter-attack 26.

The potential of even one move is not something to be trifled with.



Dia. 20




Figure 6 (27 - 37)

Fig. 6 The Theory of Groups


Black 27 is inevitable but White 28 is clearly bad. Black is allowed to make himself quite safe up to 33 and on top of that White's own group becomes heavy, which makes the approach at 34 forced.

Dia. 21 (Direction of play)

White should merely answer Black 1 at 2 and then approach on the other side at 4. This is more a question of the theory of groups than of the direction of play.

White 4 puts feelers out from Δ while waiting for Black's response before deciding how to play on the upper edge. This of course is advanced go theory.

Black can respond in various ways. If he plays at 5 White extends to 6. Once Black has played at 5 White has no need to worry about the cutting point 'a' because the lone white stone has become light.




Dia. 21


I should imagine these nuance are rather difficult to understand, but the main point is, it is better for White to start with 4 so as to be able to fight without making himself heavy. The cutting point is unimportant.

Dia. 22 (Developing)

If Black does cut at 1, White can develop with 2 and 4 and even though Black stabilises himself on the left, the corner group on the right begins to look rather unhealthy.



Dia. 22




Dia. 23

Dia. 23 (Large knight's move)

The large knight's move, Black 2, is a better reply to White 1.

Dia. 24 (Invasion)

Now if White invades the corner, Black can follow the joseki up to 8, inevitably weakening the white group on the upper edge. ▲ is also clearly more effective along the right side.



Dia. 24

We will leave the game here. By now you will most likely have realised how important the direction of play is. No doubt I have given you sufficient food for thought.

CHAPTER 4

THE PROFESSIONAL APPROACH

Professionals Are Strong

Now we are going to look at a professional game, to see how the top players take account of the direction of play.

Amateurs make countless mistakes in their games, but that's not surprising considering that they don't have to make their living out of go. For us professionals, though, momentary lapses can spell disaster.

Professionals often say that they are strong, but so they should be, since their livelihood depends on it. Go for them is not something done for pleasure, as it is by amateurs.

In other words, for pros go is a business, not a game, and they have to be strong to survive. Thus when a pro says he is strong, he is not boasting, he is stating a fact.

It would be stupid for a professional to laugh at an amateur just because he's weaker. That would show a complete lack of awareness of his own special position, but fortunately there are no professionals like that. However, the same thing applies amongst amateurs.

A strong amateur should not arrogantly lord it over weaker opponents, but neither should a weak player feel humble in the presence of strong players. Go at the amateur level is played for pleasure and the relative strengths of players has nothing to do with moral superiority.

Just enjoy it. Cast off your inhibitions, relax, let yourself go, and enjoy yourself.

Enough of the digression. Let's get on with the game.




Figure 1 (1 - 10)

Fig. 1 Kato Masao, 3-dan

This game is one I played as Black against the emerging star Kato Masao, 8-dan. It was played in the preliminaries of one of the newspaper tournaments in 1965; Kato was then only 3-dan.

In olden days it would have been unthinkable for an 8-dan to take Black against a 3-dan, but times have changed. Nowadays no-one thinks it odd. (White received a komi, of course)

Now the game. White's approach at 4 develops the star stone 2, which is alright, but it lets Black get first move in the empty corner with 5.

There is nothing wrong with White's approach at 6, but then White chose the joseki 8 and 10 as his answer to the pincer.




Figure 2 (11 - 20)


Fig. 2 Not Joseki

Black 11 expects White 12, then the moves 13 to 19 follow.

No, I won't have it. This is not joseki. We are not talking about the direction of play here, but about the strange mentality that regards this as a joseki.

In fact, in this game, through playing this way Black has already incurred a loss. I may be saying this too forcefully, but this stern kind of attitude is useful.


You see, the sequence up to White 20 has not only given White outside influence; it has also killed off the aspirations of black's star stone.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (The star stone is wasted)

If Black continues at 1 (in fact he did, for reasons we shall discuss in the next figure), and then White presses at 2, the best move locally for Black is at 3. But that would leave the 3-3 point exposed, and although White would not play at 4 immediately, it is bad for Black to leave this loose end behind.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (Overconcentration)


If Black blocks at 1 the sequence up to 11 can be expected, yet the result is that not only has Black lost the profit in the corner, but he has also been forced, in effect, to answer $\triangle$ at $\blacktriangle$, a horribly unnecessary move in this position. Of course Black would fare no better playing 1 on the other side at 2.

For Black to end up with such a poor position he must have made a mistake earlier on.


Dia. 3 (Essential)

In this position Black must, without hesitation, push out at 1, then if White blocks at 2, cut at 3. According to some there is a ladder to worry about after this cut, but there isn't. You can play this cut even if the ladder is unfavourable.

Despite the strangeness of this remark, this is the only way to play.



Dia. 3




Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Priceless)

If White blocks at 4, Black can simply play the vulgar looking 5 and 7. As White has no choice but to connect at 10 after interposing 8, Black can cut at 11 without any reservations. This is a priceless move.

With this one move Black becomes absolutely stable on the left side, and ▲ remains to provide potential for the future.

Since the ladder at 'a' does not work for White in this case, he has to defend at 12. And Black has sente.




Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (Inevitable)

Continuing on from the previous diagram, Black can move out to 1, as inevitably he will do sooner or later, but of course after White 4 the black stones are undeniably heavy.

Naturally, since one of White's groups is likewise without a base, this position is one of those where both players have to run out into the centre. Good timing is essential in such positions.



Dia. 6


Dia. 6 (Another way)

Black can also consider developing this position by pushing in and cutting with 3 and 5, sacrificing three stones up to 11, but this is merely an expedient and not necessarily worth playing. You should bear in mind, however, that this possibility exists.


Dia. 7 (Big)

Yet another way for Black to play is the knight's move of 1, making White defend at 2, and then going after the left side on a large scale by approaching at 3.


At any rate the cutting stone ▲ proves useful for Black whether it is moved out or sacrificed as here, so long as the timing is right.



Dia. 7



Dia. 8



Dia. 11 (Unfavourable ladder)


But what if the ladder should go against Black after his cut at 3? This still does not mean that White 4 and 6 work. Black can happily fight on with the atari at 9 after cutting at 7.

Obviously Black would then have in mind a plan to get some advantage in the fight on the outside by sacrificing his two stones including 1.


After Black 9 the white stone 4 cannot move.

Dia. 12 (Horrible)

If it does, Black 11 leaves White at a loss. White wants to cut at 12 but this allows Black to bend round at 15 because 13 is atari. Black now has the choice of 'a' or 'b' for his next move – either way horrible for White. Evidently White first has to dispose of the two black stones; until then he can expect no joy from fighting moves such as 12.




Dia. 11



Dia. 12

Dia. 13 (Ponnuki)


White therefore has to play something like 1, but Black will make the ponnuki capture at 2, leaving himself 'a', 'b' or 'c' for after. Black can expect nothing but good of such potential, although of course the ponnuki is an excellent thick shape in its own right.



Dia. 13

Dia. 14 (Conclusion)

The conclusion must be that White has to answer the cut 3 at 4, with the sequence we have already seen up to 11 following this. Black 3 provides future potential and Black has sente to take the pincer at 13. He is in a good fighting position.




Dia. 14


Dia. 15 (Vital point, but ...)

If White blocks at 4, however, it seems as if Black might prefer to play the hane at 5. I am sure there would be quite a few people who would play this way, either because they attach too much importance to their own stones or because they feel that this is the vital point in this shape. Although it is conceivable to have a position that would merit such a way of playing, there is no way to justify playing so low for the sake of a small profit in an opening where the fighting has not even begun.

White simply answers at 6 and Black gets a poor position.



Dia. 15




Dia. 16

Dia. 16 (Tesuji)

Black 7 next is a tesuji, but after White's atari at 8, which expects Black 9, White 10 is, in conjunction with 8, an even better tesuji.

Connecting at White 10 without playing 8 first leaves Black's centre stone ▲ light. It is better for White to make Black heavy by making him add another stone after 8; this very useful technique is well worth learning.

If Black 7 is at 'a' instead, White ataris at 8, Black plays 9, and then White 7. Either way Black's shape will be nothing to be proud of no matter how he proceeds, because he is too low.




Dia. 17

Dia. 17 (Thick)

In this case Black just has to play 11 and 13, but White gets the connection at the vital points 14 and 16. White then forces at 18 before blocking at 20, after which play is finished here for the time being. The result is clearly extremely good thickness for White.

Black has no small profit, having captured two of White's stones, but it cannot be denied that his group is facing inward and has no possibilities for future development. White's outside influence obviously gives White more say in the rest of the game, and Black's profit cannot be regarded as sufficient compensation for this. In short, Black must not play this way.



Dia. 18

Dia. 18 (Important nuance)

We have looked at various possibilities and can assume that White should not play the block at 'a' in answer to Black 1. He may therefore attack from the side at 2. If so, Black should counter strongly with 3.

A cut by White at 'a' now would take us back to Dia. 14 on page 93, so White would probably connect at 4, but since White's stones are now low Black can treat his own lightly and can leave this position, switching to the upper side at 5.


The nuances in this way of thinking may be a little difficult to understand, but the essential point is that White has ended up submitting to what are, in effect, forcing moves by Black. It is axiomatic that you can always sacrifice forcing stones without regret. Also, since White is already settled here there is no point in Black's continuing to attack him.

Dia. 19 (Potential)


Black 1 illustrates the kind of potential Black has in this position. If White cuts at 2, Black connects at 3 and 5 and if White ataris at 6 and then plays 8, Black's cut at 9 is a tesuji.

Dia. 20 (OK for Black)

If Black squeezes at 11 and 13 then blocks at 15, White, no matter how reluctantly, has to atari at 16. After White scrapes out life at 20, if Black extends to 21 he can attack White in the centre. This is quite alright for Black.



Dia. 19




Dia. 20 14: connects

Dia. 21 (Sealed in)

If White answers Black 1 at 2 in quiet fashion, Black has the possibility of sealing him in with 3 to 7. Even if he loses the corner when White cuts at 'a', Black 'b' may turn out to be a good move, depending on the game.

Anyway, the game will proceed with this potential left untapped for the time being.



Dia. 21




Figure 3 (21 - 24)

Fig. 3 The Direction Of Play


The above joseki discussion has been rather long, but the upshot is that the joseki on the lower side is bad for Black.

Black must not forget now to defend at 21.

Dia. 22 (Suffering)

From the viewpoint of the direction of play Black should play at 1, but it is intolerable for him to let White press at 2. Black 3 allows White to seal him in with 4 and the jump in to 'a' also remains for White. If Black uses 3 instead to live in the corner, White has the potential of 'b' in reserve and his framework on the left is becoming too good. Black 21 is absolutely essential.

White 22 is a forcing move and then 24 is the ideal direction of play for White's stones – all because of Black's choice of joseki on the lower side.




Dia. 22

Dia. 23 (Inadequate)

Black 2 is normally the soundest reply to White 1, but as we have already seen it is inadequate because it lets White invade at 3. Let us imagine this time, however, that Black blocks on the other side at 4. It should then be clear why this way of playing is no good for Black.

Black 23 is therefore inevitable despite all the weaknesses it leaves. In contrast White 24 is a beautiful move.



Dia. 23




Figure 4 (25 - 33)

Fig. 4 Strong Pupil

Pressing at $\triangle$ shows that White has the right sense of direction. What we are talking about now is the "power" of stones in the middle game.

White has accumulated strength in the centre as a result of the negotiations on the lower side and he is challenging Black on the basis of this. This is how "living go" develops.

Black shirks the fight with 25 and 27 because he sees that he cannot get the better of it, but it is a bitter pill for him to swallow.

Having to connect at 29 to form the inefficient pyramid shape is bad enough, but cutting at 31, though making a profit, gives White sente and fixes the course of the rest of the play.


But what if Black is more resolute?

Dia. 24 (Resolute)


Well, in this game Black cannot answer at 2. Resolve is not enough to win at go. This joseki, the taisha, is said to have over a hundred variations, all of them exceedingly complicated, but let us look at just one by way of illustration.

Dia. 25 (Continuation)


White 3 is the inevitable reply and if Black tries to connect with 4 and 6 White naturally cuts at 7. If Black extends to 8, White 9 is absolutely essential to make a base and Black 10 is also forced. If White chooses the variation where he extends to 11, Black must not omit 12, even though it is on the second line.



Dia. 24



Dia. 25




Dia. 26

Dia. 26 (Tesuji)

If White next crawls at 13, Black 14 and 16 are inevitable. White 17 now is a strange move but it is necessary because to let Black play there would cause White some embarrassment through shortage of liberties.

After Black 18, White 19 is a tesuji which Black has to answer at 20.



Dia. 27


Dia. 27 (Hard fight)

Now White plays the hane at 21. Black 22 hits the vital point, the “centre of three stones”, but White keeps up the pressure with 23 and if Black tries to make shape with 24, White can really start attacking with 27 after first settling the position with 25.

In this situation White’s star stone $\triangle$ is working well and on the right side he still has the connection at ‘a’ followed by Black ‘b’ and White ‘c’ to press Black down even further.

As White has thickness on the lower side any fight in the centre clearly favours him, and although this diagram is a rather crude example of what might develop, it is undeniable that Black is bound to have a hard time.

Having made a mistake with his selection of joseki on the lower side, Black now has his tail between his legs and White’s sense of direction has not let him down. This



Dia. 28

may be only one variation, but Black saw clearly that there was no way of counterattacking and that he had to hold back as in the Figure.


Kato is famous as one of the “three crows” or three up-and-coming stars of the Kitani school and in my time I’ve given him some drubbings, as if he were a pupil of my own. But here he is now, treading his “teacher” into the ground. It’s not good enough. Maybe that pupil’s too strong ... Lighthearted words, but at least encouraging for the world of go.

Dia. 28 (Variation)

Once Black has cut at $\blacktriangle$, there is a variation where White descends to 1 and then plays at 3 to seal Black in. How about it in this case?

Dia. 29 (Bad potential)

Next Black will attack and cut with 4 and 6, and White 7 is then forced. When Black goes back to 8, White has to give way at 9 because the ladder would not work. After defending at 10 Black has the potential of ‘a’, followed by ‘b’, which seems to make this variation one that White would not relish.



Dia. 29





Figure 5 (34 - 37)

Fig. 5 Overall Direction of Play

White actually settled the position with 34, then made the hanging connection at 36. These were the first questionable moves by young Kato.


Dia. 30 (The overall direction of play)

From the standpoint of the direction of play for the game as a whole, White 1, forcing Black 2, then the enclosure at 3 are the most appropriate moves here. Of course White cannot expect all of the area he is staking a claim to to become his territory, but if Black invades



Dia. 30


he will be a target for attack and White will be laughing because the thickness on the lower side will then really come into its own.



Dia. 31

Dia. 31 (Not too late)

Even after blocking at 34 White should play at 1. Then if Black 2, White 3 is a good move. After Black 4 White 5 and 7 expand the framework on the upper side (the profit of White 'a' remains too).



Dia. 32

Dia. 32 (Possible)

Even if the ladder after Black cuts at 2 is unfavourable to White, he will clearly be happy enough to fight with 3.

At any rate the hanging connection at 36 has a purely local orientation and disregards the game as a whole.

Black is now able to plant himself firmly in at 37 and if he turns out to be unattackable because of this, all the effort White has put into building up thickness will be wasted.




Figure 6 (38 – 41)

Fig. 6 Handling Black's Weak Group

Things had been going smoothly for White but now he is in disarray because of his mistake in the overall direction of play. The importance of a good sense of direction is painfully obvious here. In other words, directional sense is a basic ingredient for strength in the middle game.


Pincering at 38 is the only way for White.

Dia. 33 (Too slack)

If White answers unenterprisingly at 1, Black can sit back and relax with 2. The thickness on the right would then be completely ineffectual and White's position no more than an empty, broken shell.

By counterpincering at 41 in combination with his 39, Black is trying to handle this group lightly and flexibly.

As you will see if you survey the game as a whole, Black is all profit and White is all thickness. In games like this it is risky for Black to start a fight, and there is no need for it anyway. Since Black is already ahead in pure profit he has no call to be greedy and challenge White to an equal fight inside White's sphere of influence.




Dia. 33

Dia. 34 (Heavy)

This Black 1 for instance is heavy and inflexible. White can play at 2 and the black group must suffer in the midst of so much white thickness.

The flexibility of the counterpincer at 41 lies in the fact that it waits to see how White will respond; the two black stones above are treated lightly, Black being prepared to abandon them if necessary. This attitude is appropriate to the direction of play at this juncture.



Dia. 34




Figure 7 (42 - 49)

Fig. 7 Fighting


White 42 is an attempt to make Black heavy.

Dia. 35 (Trade)


Coming out at 1 instead lets Black seek compensation in the corner with 2. The sequence up to White 7 could plausibly follow, but the result is that Black has secured profit in sente and the cutting stone ▲ still has nuisance value. This is bad for White.

Dia. 36 (Heavy)

Black can also consider pushing at 2 before invading at the 3-3 point, but Black's two-stone group seems heavy



Dia. 35



Dia. 36

because of White's forcing move 'a' against the corner. The previous diagram is probably better.

Black 43 is intended to be a light move. A light way of playing is required here because this is a White-dominated area in which Black has to develop his groups quickly and flexibly.


Dia. 37 (Split in two)

Responding at 2 makes things difficult for Black: White 3 splits him in two.


Dia. 38 (One variation)

If Black next pokes in at 4, White will connect at 5 and although Black can capture with 6 and 8, White 9 causes severe problems. White has all the thickness around here and he looks likely to win the ko.

Even though White 44 then 46 constitute bad shape, they do cut Black in two and resolutely start a fight. However, Black has the tesuji combination of 47 and 49 in reserve.



Dia. 37



Dia. 38




Figure 8 (50 – 61)

Fig. 8 Success For Black


Once Black had connected at 51, White, to his distress, had to take the profit in the corner by playing the atari at 50 and then pushing through at 52.

Dia. 39 (Large framework)

White could not play 50 at 1 instead. Black 2 forces 3, then Black pushes at 4, 6, and 8, sacrificing his three stones above so that he can turn to the forcing move 10 and then 12 to build a large framework for himself on the left. Since this also implies the possibility of attacking White's lower group, White cannot countenance it.

Nevertheless, after the block at 55 Black has solved all his problems with this group. White 56 is now a vital big point, but Black forces at 57 and then closes the door with 59, laying claim to most of the left side. Things are now in Black's favour.

Although White can now play 60, Black can erase his territory with 61, these two moves having a sort of cause-and-effect relationship between them. After this the game will proceed at a pace dictated by Black.



Dia. 39

White should have won this game easily. This situation has come about through a disregard for the proper application of joseki. Black went astray first in the bottom left corner, or rather on the whole of the lower side, and as a result got a lost game. He seemed to be relying on joseki to make things easy.

Actually professionals do not adopt such a blase attitude to their games, but amateurs definitely do treat josekis as sacred cows. By definition joseki refers to 'fixed stones', but you don't have to be hidebound. You should instead be ready to adapt to changing circumstances.

As we have just seen, Black erred in his choice of joseki and the game went at White's pace. Then, however, White made a mistake in the direction of play on the upper side and with this the game swung dramatically in Black's favour. I am sure it is now crystal clear to you all how important a sense of direction is. If a favourable position that you have diligently built up for yourself can be abruptly snatched away like this, the direction of play must be critical.

It is not very easy to cultivate this sense of direction, however. The first essential is to examine the overall position frequently. By carefully considering the stones already on the board you will perceive the direction in which they are exerting their strength. Being able then to exploit that directional strength is what is meant by having a sense of direction.

That's it in a nutshell, but in actual games you have to rely on your own mental preparation and you have to put in some hard work on your own first. In saying that I am not disclaiming my responsibilities and leaving it all to you. In fact, bearing in mind what was said in the game above, it would be a good time now for us to discuss together the direction of play for josekis.

CHAPTER 5

THE DIRECTION OF PLAY AND JOSEKIS

Great Talents Mature Late

"Once that was beyond me, now I understand it." That's the sort of thing you say as you grow older, isn't it?

If you put your mind to something and persevere in an effort to improve, the day will come when it all seems to click, no matter whether that day comes later rather than sooner. As the proverb says, "Great talents mature late".

I happen to believe I have great talent. Therefore I don't mind waiting for it to mature! Some talents never seem to blossom, but since you cannot know whether the talent is really there or not, you might as well firmly believe that it is. You're not hurting anybody, so why not?

In this game I have White. Strangely enough, josekis similar to those in the game explained in the previous chapter appear here, and as play develops you might think I'm falling into the same trap even before the dust has settled. Actually, though, this game was played some time earlier.

In this case I would like you to think about the middle-game fighting, because the direction of each move depends not only on the direction of play but also on the direction of the josekis and the defects within each group. Pay particular attention to the "power" of the stones.




Figure 1 (1 - 12)

Fig. 1 The Direction of Play from the 3-5 point

Black 1 and 3 are on 3-4 points, White follows his 2 with 4 on the 3-5 point, and the stage is set for an apparently normal parallel fuseki. But take careful note of White 4. This one move has determined the nature of the rest of the game.

As you know, the direction of play from the 3-5 point is along the side, in this case up the left side. Naturally, through stressing the side, this move is weak with regard to the corner.

Black answers White 6 with safe profit-taking at 7 and 9 and there is nothing wrong with the sequence up to White 12. Now where should Black's next move be?




Figure 2 (13)

Fig. 2 The Direction of the Approach Move


Black chose to go into the corner at 13, but it is highly debatable whether this is the right direction for the approach move.

White's opening strategy is to stress the left side. By playing at the 3-5 point he is neglecting the corner, that is, he is spurning the profit there, in order to build up a superior position on the side. In view of that Black's approach move at 13 is only too welcome for White because, by playing against it, he can expand his side position.

It is one of the basic principles of go that taking profit means giving outside influence, yet players who know this often try obstinately to resist it.

Dia. 1 (Simple)

If Black plays at 1, White can simply press at 2. The sequence up to Black 5 comprises a joseki.



Dia. 1


Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (38 points)

Then, however, White cuts with 6 and 8, to make 10 a forcing move, and settles the position with 12 and 14. Turning next to 16, White wins by 38 points.

Black is too low on the lower edge, whereas White has a splendid framework on the left.

38 points is an exaggeration, of course, but I'm sure you can appreciate that White is ahead.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3 (High approach move)

In this game, if Black has to make an approach move here, the high approach at 1 is better. The pattern up to 5 has the drawback of giving White secure profit but at least Black's position is balanced.

Let us go back a step, however.

Dia. 4 (The other corner)

Black should approach the top left-hand corner to see how White will respond. Since White is laying claim to the left side Black should contest it, and he should have



Dia. 4

decided on 'a', 'b' or 'c' in the lower left corner only when he had seen how White is going to move.

In fact White's reply to this approach move is rather difficult.


Dia. 5 (Poor)

If, for instance, White emphasises the left side with 2, Black will choose the joseki at 3. White 4 next would allow Black to press at 5, much to the disgust of the stone at Δ .


Of course this is only one of many possible variations, but this diagram should be enough to highlight the weakness of a stone at the 3-5 point with regard to the corner once it has been isolated there.

Dia. 6 (Difficult)

I would expect White, therefore, to choose the high pincer at 2 but Black 3 causes complications. Whenever Black causes problems for White he is doing well.



Dia. 5



Dia. 6




Figure 3 (14 – 15)

Fig. 3 Taisha

At any rate the fact that Black chose to enter the lower left corner seems to indicate that he was being slipshod about the direction of play.

The efficiency of a move is often given only cursory attention, which is something to watch out for.

Here, for instance, White was waiting like a spider in his web, and going in at 13 was quite clearly just what he wanted.

It might be said that going along with the enemy's intentions is a possible form of strategy, which is one way of looking at it, but it doesn't ring true.

White chose to twist and turn and to invite the taisha instead of playing Dia. 2 (page 113), which we have already seen to be perfectly good.




Figure 4 (16 – 26)

Fig. 4 Blissfully Unaware

The pattern up to White 16 is one variation of the taisha. Black adopted the simple method of connecting on top at 19 because the ladder is favourable to him. He could also connect underneath at 20 of course, but this way he avoids a fight.

Against this White's profit is by no means small. The exchange is regarded as even, however, because Black's ponnuki capture at 25 gives thickness and sente.

White next tries to build up a framework with 26, but this move leaves him with a defect. Joseki in fact requires a move one line to the left. The defect produced had resounding repercussions and White, without realising it, has blighted his chances of winning.




Figure 5 (27 – 28)

Fig. 5 A Knife in the Back


White has just played $\triangle$, leaving a defect at 'a'. Black can now prowl around, in true go player's fashion, waiting for a chance to stick a knife in White's back.

He actually approached at 27, to which White's pincer is a natural reply. But was this Black's only move? In other words, does he not have a means of exploiting the defect at 'a'?


Dia. 7 (Aiming at a tesuji)

Black approaches high at 1 and if White plays 2 and 4, Black reinforces himself with 3 and 5, aiming at 7.

Perhaps it does not seem necessary to you to go in for such serious analysis, but in go it is poor policy to compromise and accept no more than even exchanges everywhere. Just imagine if you were fighting your opponent in earnest, with real swords. One slip and your head would be off!



Dia. 7




Dia. 8

Alright, maybe I'm going too far again, but at any rate wherever there is potential you must do your utmost to look for a way of exploiting it. The result may be a blind alley, but you will gain something valuable from the very process of striving to accomplish the task.

Dia. 8 (Tesuji)

White has no choice but to cut at 8. We will go into the effectiveness of $\blacktriangle$ later. Black 9 is a sparkling tesuji which Black of course had read out when he played 7 in Dia. 7.




Dia. 9

Dia. 9 (Poor for White)


White 10 is a really careless move, allowing Black to play 11 in sente. Since White 12 is indispensable Black will enjoy himself by jumping to 13. White has caused himself nothing but trouble this way as he also has to worry about his two stones floating in the centre under the shadow of ▲.

Dia. 10 (Failure)

Consequently Black 9 should be answered by this White 10. The cut at 15 follows in due course, but in this case White gets a ladder with 16, so the cut does not work. In short, a favourable ladder was the precondition for Black's strategy here.



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Dia. 11 (Hypothetical)

It's a shame that the carefully worked out tesuji misfires, but the effort expended in coming to that conclusion will not be wasted. Little by little you will be laying the foundations for improving your go strength.

In fact the tesuji works here only if Black has a stone somewhere around 'a', for then he can cut at 1, forcing White to bend at 2. Black proceeds to live up to 13 and, although it is very difficult to foresee the outcome, it should at least be clear that the fight is feasible for Black.





Figure 6 (29 - 31)

Fig. 6 That Joseki Again

The above shows that in this case, however, the low approach move is correct. It's all very well to aim at a defect, but one has to discard sequences which are not feasible.

Black 29 and 31 are naturally aiming at the defect, but Black must also take into consideration the undeveloped area at the top. This joseki came in for some severe criticism in the previous game. Since the position is different, however, the whole question has to be considered afresh.




Dia. 12

Dia. 12 (Direction of play)

As we have seen, the main centres of attention in this position are the defect at 'a' and the upper edge. The ideal thing therefore is a move taking account of both factors.

Black 1 is that move. It develops the enclosure ▲ in the right-hand corner while still aiming at 'a'. This is the correct direction of play, as the next diagram will show.



Dia. 13

Dia. 13 (Violent fight)


White's push at 2 is the natural response to Black 1. Obviously there are now several possible variations, but we shall look at the most natural sequence.

The contact play at 3 shows good timing before answering White 2 with 5 and 7. White 8 defends his cutting point and then Black invades at 9 – the ace up his sleeve.

Black 9 invites White 10, so that Black can turn at 11 with the natural flow of the game, and he is still aiming at 'a'.

Contriving this position would be a success for Black. The single stone at Black 1 at the top does not seem to be playing much of a part, but in fact, because of Black 11, there is very bad potential here for White through shortage of liberties.

Add to this his worry about the defect on the left at 'a' and it is clear that White will be sweating over his next move.



Dia. 14

Dia. 14 (Shortage of liberties)

Assume, for instance, that White plays his next move somewhere on the left side. Black's hane at 1 stumps White. White 2 is crushed by Black 3 and 5. Atari now with 'a' allows Black to cut with 'b', to which White has no answer.

Our conclusion must therefore be that Black should have put more emphasis on the upper edge. We can say this with the benefit of hindsight, but it still shows how important a sense of direction can be.

There were clues here to help in finding the right direction: the undeveloped area at the top and the defect on the left. I hope you can now appreciate that, while the potential on the left is small in itself, it has enormous significance overall.

We could even say that this was a great turning point in this game, and it all depended on the direction of play.





Figure 7 (32 – 41)

Fig. 7 Direction of the Joseki

Now, of course, White messed it all up. I played the joseki sequence 32–40 and got into the same sort of trouble as in the last chapter.

There was a reason for playing this way: the defect at 'a'. But I was attaching too much importance to it. The sequence in the figure does secure territory and defend the weak point, as expected, but it is a pity that Δ was one line too high. Looking back on it, it all seems too crude.

In this position the upper edge is still the most important area, and looked at from this point of view the direction of play from the joseki should be obvious.



Dia. 15


Dia. 15 (Sense of direction)

White should push at 1, forcing Black 2, then go all the way up to 3. This is what proper sense of direction calls for.

However, I rejected this in the actual game, the reason being that 2 makes Black strong here and heightens the value of Black 4.

Without doubt, White 1 and 3 are splendid moves, exploiting Black's open skirt but Black 4 If this move did not exist I would not have hesitated to play this way.

Actually, though, it would have been perfectly alright.




Dia. 16

Dia. 16 (Trade)

Cutting Black 1 off from above is impossible because Black's thickness with ▲ tilts any fighting in his favour. White has no choice but to give way at 2, then Black wraps himself round the white group anyway with 3. Though White can capture this stone with 4 and 6, Black takes the corner in exchange up to 13. Nevertheless, White has sente to take the big move 14, forming a large framework. Considering the size of the upper side and the fact that White can still play at 'a' to reduce Black's territory, this can't be bad.

Even so, White has another way to play which does not give up the corner, and the conclusion must be that White does not really have to fear his bad potential here.



Dia. 17

Dia. 17 (Helping move)

The alternative for White is to connect at 6, rejecting the previous trade.

If Black extends to 7, White 8 is a forcing move, as are 10 and 12, and White 14 helps the three white stones on the left. In this event the damage on the left side is kept small and the jump to 'a' is threatened. White is somewhat thin in this position but his stones are certainly working to their full extent. At any rate it is clear that the upper side is the dominant consideration in this position. Black may invade at the top and a fight will ensue, but still the direction of play is along the upper side.




Figure 8 (42 – 45)

Fig. 8 The Dust Settles

Both Black and White erred in the direction of the joseki but in the end the dust settled and a standard pattern emerged which set the stage for a tranquil middle game.

Defending the upper left corner with 42 is logical, and there can be no objection to Black's extension-cum-block 43. With 44, White protects his thinness and at the same time hints at an attack against the large black group. However, this move is not really urgent and a defensive block at 'a' on the right side would be better.

Black 45 is consequently a good point, despite being such a narrow extension. Though the top right corner is small in scale, it is still a double-wing formation and Black 45 does aim at an invasion inside White's group on the right.




Figure 9 (46 – 54)

Fig. 9 Remote Attacking Strategy

We are already moving away from the stage where the direction of play can be determined from the position alone – the complications of the middle game are about to set in – but since there are still some pointers as to the direction of attack and defence we shall go a little further.

White 46 is a forcing move, and White 48 and so on are a commonly used method of initiating a tactical encounter. This is a prelude to an attack at the vital point 54, keeping the enemy forces engaged elsewhere.

Black's territory at the top is made secure by this, but deep invasion was not possible anyway and playing forcing moves from above helps the attack on the left.




Figure 10 (55 – 68)

Fig. 10 A Splitting Attack?

Black has to get out to the centre with 55 and 57. White invades the lower side at 58, hoping to get away with a splitting attack. Black counterattacks at 59, however, and since White's single-stone group is not yet settled he cannot afford to fight.

White 60 and so on are forcing moves, after which White has to run away with 66, with no time to connect his stone 60.

White 68 connects. After this, if White can pull out to 'a' he can again aim at an attack on the black group. Connecting at 67 just because 60 was in atari would have been wrong.





Figure 11 (69 – 82)

Fig. 11 Flushing Out Black's Group

Black's territory in the lower right swells considerably with the capture of the white stone through 69 etc. but this was probably unavoidable.

In compensation White got the secure connection at 72 and also managed to pull out to 78, which revives the large-scale threat at 'a'.

Black 79 and 81 are big, securing territory in the upper right corner and also counteracting White's growing influence in the centre. However, they cede sente to White, which he uses to snatch away the base of Black's group with 82. This is also a big move in its own right.



Dia. 18

Dia. 18 (One eye in sente)

Should Black jump into the corner at 1, White does not have to answer, but if he does Black gets an eye up to 7. Since another eye is possibly assured through 'a' and 'b', this is virtually the same as getting one eye in sente and White's attack falls flat.

This is why White 82 is so big. This one move flushes Black out into the centre and as for the rest of the game we need only say that White developed his large-scale splitting attack with 'a' in the figure.

As we have seen in this game, even if only one joseki occurs the overriding concern is still for the direction of play because its importance is such as to affect the outcome of the game.

If you attach proper importance to the direction of play profit will accrue of its own accord. Being insensitive to the direction of play leads to rushing about wildly. And rushing about wildly is how you get hurt.

CHAPTER 6

ONCE UPON A GAME

Bad Patches

When you play go over a long period you have your ups and downs. According to some people life is like a sine wave, but actually it is impossible to predict our ups and downs so precisely.

Sometimes you may feel on top of the world but can't put it together on the go board. At other times you may feel as if you are going through a bad patch yet your results can be extraordinarily good.

The plain fact is that good times are good and bad times are bad and you really can't say more than that where the human mind is involved.

When you study something you go through periods when nothing seems to happen. It is like travelling through a tunnel. You may come out into the snow country, as in Kawabata's novel, or into blazing sunshine, but one thing's certain – you know you are always going to come to the end of the tunnel.

No matter how long your tunnel or bad patch may go on, it's just a question of plodding on.

In this game I am White again, though neither this nor the identity of my opponent is of much significance. The all-important task, as always, is to analyse the direction of play.

Incidentally, I'm not implying that I was going through a bad patch when I played this game.




Figure 1 (1 – 6)


Fig. 1 Mokuhashushi

Black 1 at komoku is a standard move. But consider White 2 carefully. It is on mokuhashushi, the 3–5 point.

Having played here White must now choose a fuseki which exploits the power of this stone. This explains White's approach move 4 as the answer to Black 3. This is not so much a question of White's dictating the play as something that is inevitable.

Black 5, also on mokuhashushi, is based on the "theory of opposing komokus". White 6 at san-san is also part of his strategy of emphasising the mokuhashushi stone 2. The direction of play has once again dominated the opening.

Let us look at this in more detail.



Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (Stressing the side)


White's approach move was absolutely essential to exploit the stone △ on mokuhashushi in the lower right corner.

As I have already said, the direction in which △ is exerting its power is along the side, and here there is also the possibility of a large-scale pincer attack with 1 and 3. The position of △ would then be a potent force in the formation of White's framework.

That is not to say that the whole of the right side would turn into white territory; but if Black should invade he will be quite unable to make a two-space extension and thus a base on the third line between 1 and △ (assuming alternate moves of course).

Later on White might be able to play 'a' to seal Black in or 'b' to chase him into the centre; either way the effect of △ is quite clear.

This is what fuseki is all about: making moves on the strength of the stones already played. It is wrong to assume blithely that it makes no difference where you play the first few moves.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (Example)


For instance, let us consider what happens if we follow the principle of giving priority to empty corners and thus play White 1.

If Black then approaches at 2 and White extends to 3, Black can exchange 4 for 5 before enclosing the corner with 6. Being able to make this enclosure is good news for Black.

This way of playing makes no use at all of the power and special features of the △ stone, which instead merely ends up as part of a small and somewhat overconcentrated group on the right side. Such small-scale, stingy positions do not lead to free and easy games.

In short, to make △ effective an approach move in the upper right corner is indispensable and Black must not be allowed to enclose the corner as he does with 6 in this diagram.


The Theory of Opposing Komoku



Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (First move)


White $\triangle$ and Black $\blacktriangle$ oppose each other in symmetry on komoku. According to the theory of opposing komoku such positions favour the player who makes the first approach move (Black here), the reason obviously being that the first to play can settle the position to his advantage. As soon as Black plays 1 he has a straightforward numerical superiority of two to one on the upper side.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Advantage)


If White continues with an identical approach move at 2, Black gets an advantage by combining a pincer with an extension at 3. This is no more than common sense in fuseki, but there is a significance in the fact that I have suddenly mentioned this theory here.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (Transposition)

It is this: if, as in Fig. 1, White approaches at 1 Black should immediately play 2 at mokuhashushi, so that if White then approaches at 3 Black can pincer at 4 and transpose back to the favourable position of opposing komoku.



Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (Three-three point)

White therefore chooses to invade at the three-three point with 1 here.

Naturally there are good reasons for this, one being that it avoids the opposing komoku but another important reason is that White is going to place emphasis on the right side.

At any rate if Black again tries the pincer at 2 White can now play the knight's move 3. Since White 1 now has a firmly anchored base, White 3 is in a powerful position. This shows that White 1 is the appropriate move.




Figure 2 (7 – 16)

Fig. 2 Stressing the Side


It is natural for Black to press at 7.

Dia. 7 (Perfect)


Were White to answer Black 1 with 2, Black's pincer at 3 would be perfect. Therefore the sequence starting with White's pincer 8 in the figure followed.

White settles his shape with the sequence to 16 and his idea of stressing the right side has worked out splendidly. On the other hand, White $\triangle$ in the upper left corner has not gone unscathed. White has sacrificed this stone to give himself the opportunity to stress the right side.

Incidentally, note the order of play for White's extension 12. The right order of moves is a common problem in go and is not to be dismissed lightly.




Dia. 7



Dia. 8

Dia. 8 (Normal)


The normal order of play against Black 1 would be to extend upwards to 2, followed by Black 3 and White 4. But — and this is where go is difficult — this sequence is not guaranteed.



Dia. 9

Dia. 9 (Variation)

If White plays 2 first, Black will switch to the checking extension 3 using his stone $\blacktriangle$ as support. This would be grim.



Dia. 10


Dia. 10 (Inevitable)

If Black checks at 1, White inevitably pushes in at 2 in self-defence. After Black 3 to 7 –

Dia. 11 (Scotched)


Black resists White 8 with a ko, then answers 10 with 11. White naturally has to fill the ko with 12, but then Black approaches at 13, scotching completely White's claim to the right side, the original intention of △.

Even allowing for the fact that White has made a little



Dia. 11 12: connects

profit in the top right-hand corner, his stone △ is crying pitifully. All because a slight error in the order of moves led to missing the direction of play, please note.




Dia. 12

Dia. 12 (Slide)

That means White must extend to 1 first. If you are wondering what happens if Black then hanes at 2, the answer is that White will slide out to 3. The black group, without a base, can then be attacked.

Since this is rather good for White, Black naturally plays as in the figure.



Dia. 13

Dia. 13 (Potential)

In the upper left corner White's stone has been marooned by Black ▲, but there is still some potential left. For instance, White checks on the outside at 1, threatening 'a': Black does something like 2 and 4; the potential has served its purpose.




Figure 3 (17 – 29)

Fig. 3 Fight in the Lower Left


Black's long extension to 17 is a natural move, combining expansion of his own area with restriction of White's development from his small knight's-move enclosure.

White 18 follows the basic principle of approaching on the wider side, but an alternative to Black's two-space pincer can be considered.


Dia. 14 (One-space pincer)

It is the single-space pincer, Black 1. After the sequence to Black 7 the direction of the territories is completely different on the lower edge in comparison with the figure; but it is difficult to say which is better. At any rate, in the figure the emphasis has been put on the left side.

Once White comes in to 20 the joseki sequence to 28 follows. Black 29, defensive and thick, is not without an element of overconcentration.



Dia. 14



Dia. 15

Dia. 15 (High)

In this position Black 1, high so that it can aim next at pressing at 'a', is perhaps better, since the focus of this game is on the right side. If White jumps to 'b', Black can push at 'c' in sente; the upper left corner is secure, so Black can afford to fight here and has no need to rush to defend. Since ▲ is not so weak, Black can play high with 1 to stress the centre.




Figure 4 (30 – 32)

Fig. 4 Left and Right Sides

White is satisfied with raising his standard at 30.


Dia. 16 (Too local)

In relation to the corner enclosure White's checking extension at 1 is ideal. But this betrays thinking about only the local instead of the overall situation. Even if White checks at 1, Black, having already defended at ▲, has little to fear from an attack on his lone stone on the lower edge.


Black 2 on the right-side star point is an ideal invasion which utterly spoils White's dream of monopolising the right side. Indeed, White ▲ is now under attack and the initiative has passed to Black. Thinking locally and forgetting the overall position is tantamount to being blind to the direction of play.

Black's checking extension 31: this is highly dubious. The reason is that, at present, White is in the process of

enlarging his position on the right side. Black should be thinking of impeding him. Black 31 is a mistake, despite its importance for the lower edge, because it lets White play 32.




Dia. 16



Dia. 17

Dia. 17 (Solid)

The more solid extension to Black 1 is similar. White plays 2.




Dia. 18

Dia. 18 (Manoeuvring)

Black 1 is the move to hit the vital point, to impede White's expansion.

Since Black hardly has to worry about ▲, he is not restricted by it (that is, he does not have to adopt a defensive posture). Had Black ▲ been weak Black 1 would have been questionable, but this is not so: the stones must go in the main direction of play.



Dia. 19

Dia. 19 (Sabaki)

If Black plays 1, of course White separates him with 2. Black 3 is then a group-settling tesuji that everyone knows. White would probably draw back to 4 to make it difficult for Black to settle his group but Black can do this anyway with 5.


Dia. 20 (Unexpected)

Also, if White hanes underneath at 4 Black cuts at 5 to get the forcing plays 7 and 9 and the result up to 11 is unexpected but welcome.


Dia. 21 (Painful)

To cut next at 12, inviting Black 13 and 15, would harm White's stones on the right side. It is clear that Black has managed the fighting skilfully.

Anyway, Black should have turned to restricting White's territory on the right, but he played 31 on the lower edge and allowed White 32. The middle game is plainly going to be about White's right side versus Black's left side.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21




Figure 5 (33 – 41)

Fig. 5 *Fighting Breaks Out*


Black 33 is the obvious move to exploit the defects in White's shape.

Because Black is exposed to invasion on the lower edge he will be forced to defend eventually, but first he wants to seize the chance to start a fight. This "chance to start a fight" is Black 33: when White replies at 34, Black decides to cut with 35 and 37, forcing White 38, so that he can defend in tempo with 39.

When White ataris at 40 Black switches to counterattack at 41 by slicing through White's knight's move.

The fighting has at last begun. The question is whether Black can make his cut at 37 tell. Of course if Black 37 were to be captured first it would be too late to play 41 successfully: now is the chance. The stage is set for a middle game where success will perhaps depend on pure reading ability.


By the way, in case you are thinking that Black 37 can escape because the ladder is favourable.....



Dia. 22

Dia. 22 (Block)

It would be ideal if Black could escape with 1, but White strikes back with 2 and 4. Black is trapped not in a ladder but in a geta.



Dia. 23

Dia. 23 (Capture)

Black can try 5 but White, it must not be overlooked, has the forcing move 6. Black has to connect at 7, then White 8 and 10 spell Black's downfall.




Figure 6 (42 – 51) 48: connects


Fig. 6 A Grave Fight

White is compelled to play 42 but with Black 43 the fight assumes serious proportions. It is no longer a question of direction of play but of technique and of who can read the furthest.

The atari in the corner, White 44, is suspect. Because of this move Black can interpolate the cut at 45 which leaves very bad potential for White.

Dia. 24 (Preserving the right side)

Better for White is to atari this way, at 1, and after the forcing move 3 he can return to 5. White is thus treating his two stones in the centre lightly. If Black blocks at 6 White can make the right side safe with the hanging con-



Dia. 24


nection 7. Since his two stones still have some potential he can be satisfied with the outcome.

In the figure Black can come out at 49 because 45 spoils White's blocking tesuji.


With 50 White has to fight with a heavy group in the centre: he has been rent in two: his failure is patent. The fact is, White has been overestimating the value of 50, which is demonstrated by Black's turn to 51.

Dia. 25 (Ladder)

Of course White has no time to wedge in at 1 – Black 2, 4 and 6 set up a ladder.



Dia. 25



Dia. 26

Dia. 26 (Block)


But in the case of Dia. 24 if Black answers White's hane with the block at 2, White 3 is beautifully timed.

Black has to capture with 4 and this gives White time to go back to 5 and restrain the black stone.

If Black comes out at 6 White's blocking tesuji 7 works. In this position Black's cut at 'a' comes too late.

Dia. 27 (Sacrifice)

If Black replaces 4 of the last diagram with this 4, White has only to play 5. After cutting at 6 Black can escape with 8 but since Black has been forced to connect inefficiently at 4 White can sacrifice his two stones without regret. The sequence 9 to 13 is then highly satisfactory for him.



Dia. 27




Figure 7 (52 - 57)

Fig. 7 The Art of Fighting

White 52 is obviously to prevent a ladder. There must be some anxiety in that it leaves lots of cutting points, but since Black has to go back to 57 at some time he can not be complacent. Herein lies the art of fighting.

With 53 and 55 Black achieves a ponnuki but White 54 and 56 come at him from behind, once again pointing the finger at Black's defect on the lower side.

Eventually Black goes back to 57 but of course this means he has to take time off from the fight above.

In any case, although the fight is moving in the wrong direction for White on account of his mistake, it cannot be denied that he is doing reasonably well.





Figure 8 (58 – 62)

Fig. 8 New World

Black cannot answer White 58 by connecting as the ladder is unfavourable. Instead he plays an atari of his own and after he defends at 61 the fighting here comes to a pause.

Somehow White has held on to the right side, but it is a trifle smaller than he expected. In addition the three white stones on the lower edge have been all but captured on a large scale. Of course it is not impossible to move these stones out – but they would be an enormous burden. That fact alone underlines White's mistake, a mistake of just one move.



Dia. 28

White jumps in to 62 aiming at reduction of Black's territory. This definitely cannot be put off any longer.

You too have probably often had this experience of doing badly in the fighting and getting what looks like a lost game. But that is perhaps another turning point in the game. Provided that you don't feel discouraged you can come back: a game of go is a drawn out affair and a chance to recover will surely be offered.

Dia. 28 (A time to think)

It is supremely obvious that when White invades at 1 Black will attack at 2, making use of his thickness. The game will hinge now on how White defends. The prospects are not so bad for him that he has to be pessimistic. But now is a time to settle down to think carefully.

Dia. 29 (Extending inwards)


White simply extends inwards to 1, answers Black's block 2 at 3, and after the preparation of 5 skilfully cuts at 7.

Dia. 30 (Defending successfully)


If Black next plays 8 White 9 is sente. Black 10 is forced, then after the ponnuki capture 11 White is virtually alive already.

Dia. 31 (Alive)


Black would therefore probably choose to atari at 8. White connects at 9, obliging Black to capture at 10, then lives with 11 to 15.




Dia. 29



Dia. 30



Dia. 31



Dia. 32


Dia. 32 (Start of the endgame)

From now on the endgame starts.

Black 1 is big: while expanding his centre Black is limiting White's right-side territory. If White now checks at 2, reinforcing his group at the top and threatening tricks in the corner, it is a fair exchange for Black to defend at 3. White pokes his head out at 4, breathing hope into his three-stone group abandoned on the right, but Black seals it in with 5.

The point is that while White may be thinking he was losing it is by no means certain. Patience is called for here. Being patient is not the same as giving up. It is rather a question of playing on to aim at turning the tables or at least going down with colours flying.

In these cases of course it is necessary to be able to count accurately.



Dia. 33

Dia. 33 (Still hopeful)

Following on from the previous diagram, White 6 is the most valuable move. Then if Black blocks at 7 White erases the centre with 8. The game depends now on what becomes of the centre. If Black surrounds the centre the white territory at the top will, through a cause-and-effect relationship, swell of its own accord. In that event it is by no means definite that Black will win. Try a rough count for yourself. The main point is that White can still be hopeful. Playing with patient self-control is the key.

However, White in this case dug his own grave by losing his patience. The denouement is in the final figure.




Figure 9 (63 – 79)

Fig. 9 The end

White 64 is a huge mistake. Because this prompts Black 65 White loses the chance to play 69. Compare this with Dia. 29 (page 160). The hane-and-cut would no longer work. Inevitably White has to attach at 66 but Black's cut at 67 is a severe counterattack: White is in trouble.

Come what may (or is it in desperation?) White hanes at 68, but Black coolly captures at 69 and White is stuck for a continuation.

After interposing the forcing move 70 White switches to a good point with 72 and 74, but this lets Black cut at 75 and White has come to the end of the road.

After White 76 and Black 77 the cut at 79 is the final blow: with his group on the left in tatters White definitely has nothing left to fight for.

Deep thought was required at the time of White 64, but the hane chosen in the end brought about White's downfall.

Looking back on this game it should be evident that it was governed largely by White's second move on moku-hazushi. The fuseki was all about trying to make best use of the direction of play and the special features of that stone. I hope I have convinced you finally that it does make a difference where you play in the opening.

A stone on moku-hazushi has power and directionality. Fitting these into the overall framework is the art of go: for this you need a sense of direction.

This was not so important in this game once the fight in the lower right corner began, for it became more a matter of reading ability than of the direction of play. At least it is certain that a sense of direction alone was not sufficient.

Fighting games are governed by reading ability. One can go even further perhaps: all games depend on it. I expect you realised this having seen what happened on the left side.

CHAPTER 7

TEST YOURSELF

Seven Problems


Go is not just about joseki and fuseki. Everybody knows that. It's about the direction of play.

Because joseki and fuseki can be regarded as technical applications of the direction of play they must clearly be relevant, but the most important thing is to discover in what directions stones are exerting their power, taking into account the configuration of the stones.

Attack and defence also stem from the direction of play – your ability to analyse this determines your strength. In other words, whenever making a move you should select it with due regard to the relative positions of the stones at that time and place. There is no need to justify a move on the basis of joseki or fuseki theory – you have only to find the best move. That is what go is about.

This is not as simple as it sounds, because for one thing, it implies mastery of fuseki and joseki, but in essence I believe go can be described this way.

Let us see now whether you have learnt anything from this approach to go. Seven problems follow. Imagine that you are actually playing a game, so settle down and think.




Problem 1

PROBLEM 1 BLACK TO PLAY

Try this one first. Of course it is not one of your own games, but please try to treat it as such, rather than as a problem in a book.

Black and White are building large frameworks. Where are the key points in this position – remembering that you must consider the configuration of the stones?

The important thing is to examine the direction in which stones are exerting their power as determined by the structures each player has adopted. Apart from that you are getting no clues! There is no-one to help you in real games, so you have to learn to do it all on your own.



Dia. 1


Dia. 1 (The cap is correct)

Black's cap at 1 is the correct direction of play. How about you? Did you feel this was the right area?

Following the usual fuseki idea of giving priority to enclosures and approach moves would suggest a black approach at 'a'. However, try to visualise a white play at 1. This one move would see White's framework blossom on the lower edge and right side. In short, the direction of play from this position is towards 1.

The cap by Black is not a particularly severe attack, but this one move frustrates White's strategy, so it shows correct overall positional judgement.


The important aspect here is timing. If the lower left corner position is settled first it would be too late.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (Light and flexible)

One way for White to answer the cap is the diagonal play 2. After Black 3 and White 4, Black employs the standard technique of crosscutting to give his group a light and flexible shape. Heavy plays are not called for here because Black is simply trying to erase White's area.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (Good timing)

Continuing from the last diagram, White 8 is forced and then Black forces again with 9 and 11 before making the approach at 13.


White's framework can no longer blossom as it could before and now is the time for Black to seize the opportunity of turning to 13. Black is doing well.



Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Variation)


Another possible answer to the cap is this White 2. Its purpose is to stress the lower side but things may not work out the way White wants. Black 3 is a standard move for developing a light and flexible group.



Dia. 5 10: connects

Dia. 5 (Success)

White will follow up with something like 4 and 6 but Black 7 and 9 cut White in two. Although White can attack with 12, Black 13 is enough to ensure life. Black can play this way with confidence because he has not settled the position in the lower left corner.




Problem 2

PROBLEM 2 WHITE TO PLAY

Black actually approached at 1. As already explained, this is not likely to be the right answer, though other people may have other ideas.

This time pretend you are White. You have some help in this case as there is a clue implicit in the answer to the previous problem. You have to develop the white framework while exposing the incorrectness of Black 1. What is White's next move?



Dia. 1


Dia. 1 (The cap again)

The capping play White 1 is correct.

This move is generally considered irregular but that need not concern you. Since the white stones are exerting their power by threatening to form a framework based on the lower right corner, they determine the direction of play. Thinking that way brings moves such as White 1 to mind.

Of course this cap does not turn all of the right side of the board into white territory, but one thing is certain: White 1 plays a major part in building up White's framework on the right.

This is merely a case of adopting a consistent fuseki strategy and the following diagrams will show how appropriate White 1 is.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (Large framework)

Black has various possible answers to White 1 but the invasion at the 3-3 point would be the most usual.

Naturally White presses at 3 and Black 4 and White 5 follow in due order. Black 6 is one way of protecting against White's push-through and cut, but then White 7 expands the framework even further.

Black profit against white influence: a normal exchange, but it must be said that White's framework is looking gigantic. It is most unlikely that this will all become white territory, but capping at 'a' is already too late. In other words, it is much more difficult to reduce this area after White has built up the wall with 3 to 7.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (Inevitable)


If Black instead plays this 1, White's crosscut 2 and 4 still, inevitably, builds up the framework on the right.

Dia. 4 (Same thing)

If Black pulls back to 5, White does likewise with 6 then follows Black 7 with the knight's move 8. White has the same sort of huge framework as before, but with the added bonus of a nice erasing move at 'a' to aim at.



Dia. 4




Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (Different)


Black might come in at the vital point to erase the framework, but the situation is now a lot different to what it was before. Then we saw White 2 and Black 3.

Dia. 6 (Painful)

Assume the rest of the sequence shown on page 170 and this time it is apparent that Black is swimming in a sea of white influence. He is in a painful predicament after White 2.



Dia. 6




Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (Right side)

Black can invade and live quite easily with 1 and 3, but White gets the ideal point 4 and suddenly the right side is blossoming. In short, this framework is difficult to invade.

As a game proceeds, what was once a good move may no longer be so good. Vital points have to be grabbed at the right time and any delay can spell disaster.

4 was a good point for Black in Problem 1 but here he has left it too late.




Problem 3

PROBLEM 3 BLACK TO PLAY

In the actual game, however, White chose to answer Black 1 with the pincer 2.

Black 1 should have been at 'a' and White 2 should have been at 'b' but both Black and White have erred in their sense of direction. Nevertheless, moves cannot be taken back and so Black has to consider what he should do with the situation as it is. What is his correct direction of play?




Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (The counterpincer is correct)

In this position the large framework must still be foremost in your mind. This fuseki is all about White trying to build up his framework while Black is trying to destroy it.

It is also good go sense for Black to consider why White played the two-space pincer and to try to oppose his intentions. Looked at this way, Black 1 is the obvious direction of play.

As you know, Black 1 is a method used for developing a light, flexible group inside an enemy dominated area while deftly avoiding any fighting. If the situation demands, Black is also prepared to abandon ▲. Such an attitude is in accord with the overall requirements of this position.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (Frustrating the opponent)

If White answers the counterpincer with 2, Black plays the hane 3 then invades the corner at 5. White 6 is met by Black's connection 7 and if now White bends round at 'a', Black will be able to move against the framework on the right.

It is difficult to explain why this diagram is so good for Black, but the answer lies in the fact that Black is frustrating White's intentions. Thus, although this is a second-best for Black, he can still be satisfied because he is at last on the right track after his mistake earlier on.

In go one of the objectives is to avoid doing what your opponent wants, but by the same token things do not always happen the way *you* want, and a certain amount of flexibility is called for.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (Small scale)

White 2 on the other side — Black plays 3 and 5. Against White 6 Black makes a safe group on the lower side with 7 and counters White 8 by jumping out lightly to 11.

With this White's framework has been cut right down and the game will become small in scale, which is the opposite of what White wanted.

Now why should this way of thinking be so important?



Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Hoped for)


Going back to when White pincer at $\triangle$, he was hoping that Black would come in to the 3-3 point. Of course, in local terms this is a standard joseki, but in this position it is poor.

The sequence up to White 10, including the push-through and cut tesuji 6 and 8, starts a well known joseki.


Dia. 5 (Large framework)

Consider the position after White 14 to 20.

A majestic territorial framework is dominating the board from the left side to the right across the lower edge. This is of course what White wants, so Black cannot play this way.



Dia. 5




Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (Not good)

Black's jump to 1 is also joseki. In this case, however, it is a loss to allow White to extend to 2, because when Black slides in at 3 White would probably answer with the cap at 4. In this position White 'a' is too small: White 4 clearly seems more substantial in view of the framework it creates.

If Black comes in now at 'a', White jumps to 'b' and makes his potential territory alarmingly large. Black 3 at 4 only leads to giving White solid territory.

What this means in short is that this position is not good for Black.



Dia. 7


Dia. 7 (Actual game)

In the actual game, however, Black did play 1 and 3 and White did answer at 4. This 4 should have been at 'a'. Black 5 brought the joseki to a close but overall Black's positions are too low.

White 6 next was most peculiar. With the black stone ▲ jutting out along the upper side invasion is impractical and the idea behind 6 was therefore to erase Black's area lightly.

Looking at things in the cold light of day, however, and seeing the board as a whole, the direction of play just cries out for White 'a'.

It certainly cannot be bad for White to play at 'a'. On the contrary he has every reason to welcome the large framework it gives him.



Dia. 8


Dia. 8 (For reference)

This diagram is just to show you how the game continued. A fight developed at the top and the course of events then was inevitable. Nevertheless, White 16, inviting Black to bend round at 17, seems to have ended up pointing in quite the wrong direction of play relative to the other White stones.

White 18 is still a good point but circumstances have changed and it now prompts Black's good counterattack 23.

Black 21 forces a response from White and is a skilful erasing move which will also play a part in the subsequent fighting.

At all events it should be obvious that within the space of a few moves both players have missed the right direction of play several times. This example has been a good one and should provide a lot of food for thought.




Problem 4

PROBLEM 4 WHITE TO PLAY

Now a completely different position from another game.

Black started with the double-star arrangement on the right whilst White took up a position on the left with stones at komoku and mokuhashushi. A fight has begun in the lower left corner and we are now part of the way through a particular joseki. Black has just played the diagonal attachment 1. Where would you play next as White?

The four corners have already been occupied so you have to look ahead beyond the end of the joseki. Which is the direction of play that would make 100% use of all the stones?



Dia. 1


Dia. 1 (Simple extension is correct)

This position calls for White's simple extension to 1. How powerful this feels!

The way you should be thinking here is that the thickness created by White 1 works well with the white stone $\triangle$ already in the top left-hand corner. Omitting White 1 would be depriving $\triangle$ of its power.

There is, nevertheless an obvious defect at 'a' which seems perhaps to inhibit White 1, and however good a point 1 may be it cannot be played without preparing an answer to Black's cut at 'a'.


White naturally does have a suitable answer, even though it will mean giving way a little.



Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (The cut)


So what is White's response to Black's cut 2?



Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (Sacrifice)

It is to abandon two stones with 3 and 5. If Black cuts again at 6, White ataris at 7 and then makes shape with 9. The two white stones are not yet dead anyway because the connection along the edge with 'a' remains.



Dia. 4


Dia. 4 (Raising the standard)

Black will probably continue by capturing at 1. Omitting this and letting White connect along the edge not only loses a substantial profit but also puts Black's corner group in danger.

Now White is free to raise his standard over the left side with 2. This one move transforms the framework on the left into a *territorial* framework and White's strategy must be regarded as successful.

Black naturally attacks at 3 but when White plays at 4 it looks terribly as if Black has been given the runaround.

It is disappointing for White that Black has made profit in the corner, has gained the checking extension 3 and has some sort of attack going. But these three disadvantages must be set against what White's extension to $\triangle$ and White 2 will bring on the left side as his framework expands. The balance is in White's favour.




Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (Shortsighted)

White has defended at 1. Aware of his cutting point he has guarded against the cut but such straightforward defence is not good enough.

The reason is that he is in trouble after Black's hane 2 and pincer 4. In other words, because White cannot see beyond the safety of his group he is in fact exposing himself to a large-scale attack.

Of course the cut at 'a' remains as a threat against Black but while Black is attacking severely with 4 White has no time to play there. In short, if White thinks only of safety his stones become heavy.



Dia. 6


Dia. 6 (Provocative)

If White has to defend on the lower edge a three-space extension to 1 is better. It leaves a gap and seems provocative, but it is harder for Black to attack.

For instance, Black's checking extension to 'a': White can jump to 'b' and the defect at 'c' looms large: Black will therefore be reluctant to play 'a'. He would probably leave the lower edge alone and break up White's growing framework by approaching in the top left-hand corner.

White's pincer at 5 is a natural way to use the support-wall below, but this enables Black to play lightly at 6.

This Black 6 is important because of the direction of play.




Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (Playing on the outside)

Switching to ▲ is an orthodox approach – Black does not want to start a fight in White's sphere of influence. In addition, this stone works in concert with Black's star point stone in the upper right corner to control the centre. Even if White next attaches at 1, Black is happy to play 2 to 6. Black builds up his strength at the top and whatever happens ▲ is in a good position.

The white territory on the left may seem big, but he has invested a lot of capital here, so letting him take this amount of territory is in accordance with the logic of go.

Most important, though, I would like you to appreciate the desirability of Black's position at the top. Look at all the influence that he has built up in this virgin area where fighting is about to break out. This is a splendid example of the correct direction of play.



Dia. 8


Dia. 8 (Black is in trouble)

In other words, answering White's pincer at 1 by starting a fight with 2 and 4 does not work well here. Since Black is fighting in his opponent's sphere of influence his strength is naturally inferior, so clearly he will have a hard time in the fighting.

Black can play the standard combination of 6 and 8, but when White resists with 9 and 11, Black is in trouble.

The crucial point here is that when White plays a stone at 13, the influence of Black's star point stone in the top right corner is adversely affected. This alone is sufficient reason for avoiding the sequence here.

Actually, we have got off the track a little in this discussion. Let's see what actually happened in the game in the next problem.




Problem 5

PROBLEM 5 BLACK TO PLAY

White made the tight defensive move of 1 in the game. Black defended his cutting point with 4 and White also defended at 5. This sequence is of course a failure for Black. As stated earlier, making a pincer at 'a' instead of 4 would be more severe.

However, one small failure is not significant. If it is not a fatal mistake, one can forget about it and try to find the next best move.

Well, what is the next best move? Needless to say, the direction of play is on the left.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (The splitting move is correct)

Black 1, splitting up the left side, is the correct answer. Moreover, this stone is ideally positioned. We called it a splitting move, but actually Black is taking a positive approach — if things go well, he hopes to attack the white wall.

Of course, in this position it is easy to see that the direction of play is to prevent White from building a moyo on the left side, but this splitting play is not so much concerned with reducing as it is with attacking. This is the reasoning behind Black 1, but one cannot give a formal reason why this move must be at 1. This is something which is decided partly by intuition, partly by analysis. In short, experience.




Dia. 2

Dia. 2 (The next move)

In other words, the reason why Black 1 is the correct point is that if White plays 2 to prevent Black from making an approach move, Black can apply pressure on a large scale with 3. Thus, Black has a good follow up.

The points 2 and 3 are miai. The value of Black 1 is that one can choose either of these points, depending on how White answers. If Black gets to play at 3, the diagonal connection ▲, which received some criticism as a slack move, is now transformed into a magnificent move.

“Misfortune can be changed to fortune.” In go, with its emphasis on the efficiency of stones, this proverb has an important meaning.




Dia. 3

Dia. 3 (Resolute)

When Black surrounds on such a large scale, White has no choice but to do something. White 1 and 3 may be crude, but this cannot be helped.

Black plays 2 and 4; he is quite unbending. By unbending, I do not mean that Black is trying to kill White; he is only determined to make the most of the ▲ stone. Of course, he cannot expect to actually capture White.

White desperately tries to break out with 5 and 7, but when Black extends at 8, White cannot go any further.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (Outward influence)

White has no choice but to connect at 9. Black then blocks at 10 whereupon White naturally cuts at 11. Black sacrifices his stone with 12 and 14. Black has built up a magnificent wall on the outside.

White's territory on the left is not to be lightly dismissed as it exceeds fifteen points, but it is a fixed territory with no potential for expansion. Compare this with Black's magnificent outward influence. Playing Black 'a' next, making sanren-sei, would be more than enough.

Black is left with a cutting point at 'b', but when one considers that the fighting in this area has already been concluded there is no hurry to defend this point. In any case, Black's success cannot be doubted. The reason for it is that he started out with the intention of attacking. If he had just meant to reduce White's moyo, he would not have got this result. The important thing in go is to play with a positive attitude.




Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (Comfortable)

However, if White tries to avoid the result in the preceding diagram by turning at 2, Black can make the approach move at 3. As stated earlier, 2 and 3 are miai and as long as this is so, Black 1 is obviously appropriate. At any rate, if Black gets to make an approach move at 3, the overall position is clearly an easy one for him. White's area on the left has vanished into mist and on top of this pressure is being applied to his solitary stone at the top, while his group at the bottom still does not have a base.

Even if White plays 2, Black is unaffected as he has already defended at ▲. In addition, the two black stones 1 and 3 are almost settled. I'm sure that everyone will agree that the fighting to come will be easy for Black.

Dia. 1 showed us the correct point. However, this was not the move actually played in the game.




Dia. 6

Dia. 6 (The actual game)

Black chose to make the large knight approach move at 1. This, however, was obviously a failure.

When White makes a checking extension at 2, any attack against White is out of the question and ▲ loses its meaning. In fact, this is purely a minus for Black since it has been exchanged for △. In short, rather than being an approach move, one could almost regard Black 1 as a reducing move, that is, a negative, timid move. This is inconsistent with Black's solid move at ▲.

Just look at this position. When White counterattacks with 2, Black has no choice but to settle himself by attaching at 3. In other words, he is fleeing from attack.




Dia. 7

Dia. 7 (Joseki)

The hane of White 4 next is natural. This is a joseki, but in any case no other move is conceivable.

Cutting at 5 is also forced, and giving atari with 6, then 8 is the correct order. The sequence to 11 is forced.

An exchange of the corner for the left side cannot be avoided. If one looks back at the starting point, this is clearly a major variation, but one cannot say that Black has done well, the reason being that the exchange of ▲ for △ is a minus for Black.




Problem 6

PROBLEM 6 BLACK TO PLAY

White's aim in making the checking extension at 1 is to gain momentum for defending on the left. This is a joseki move.

It is now Black's turn to play. There are two points that he has to consider in this position. The first is that △ is a narrow pincer. The second is the existence of ▲ in the upper right corner. Naturally this problem is confined to the upper part of the board. Nothing else need be considered. The key to determining the direction of play is the presence of the two triangled stones. What does Black do?




Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (The turning move is correct)

In this position turning at 1 is correct. That is to say, since White's pincer with $\triangle$ is a narrow one, Black does not mind settling the position here. Moreover, White's position at the bottom left is solid. Consequently, it does not matter if White gets territory on this side provided one gets compensation at the top. This is the correct approach.

Dia. 2 (The correct direction)


If White answers Black 1 with the hane at 2, Black naturally cuts at 3. This does not mean that Black is going to try to save the cutting stone, rather his aim is to utilize it as a sacrifice. White has no choice but to play hane at 4.



Dia. 2

Next Black plays 5 even though this is bad shape. White must extend to 6, whereupon Black has the superb move of 7, enclosing the top right corner. This is the correct direction of play.

You may wonder why Black does not attack the isolated $\triangle$ stone, and whether 7 is not a slack move. This is an important question of perception concerning strength and weakness. $\triangle$ is certainly isolated, but this is in appearance only. Actually, it is not a weak stone. Go strength is what enables one to make this assessment which is backed up by observation of the overall position. To repeat, $\triangle$ is not weak! We will demonstrate this in the following diagrams.



Dia. 3


Dia. 3 (The focal point)

Assume that White does docilely answer Black 1 at 2. Black is happy to keep on pushing with 3 and 5, regarding these as forcing moves, before taking up position with 7. White now has a nice solid position on the left. This is natural when one has chosen a joseki which involves an exchange of territories, so there is nothing for Black to worry about. Giving the opponent territory is quite often the correct approach. What one should be concerned with here, rather, is Black's position at 7.

Dia. 4 (Far from weak)

Wanting to attack with Black 1 instead of 7 in Dia. 3 is natural. I am sure that there are a lot of readers who would like to play this way. However, Black 1 shows that the player has not had a close look at the overall position.

If White cuts at 2, Black cannot omit reinforcing at 3.




Dia. 4

White next defends at 4 and he is hardly under attack anymore. In fact the reverse, as White can now aim at invading at 'a'.

If Black defends this weak point, however, Black 1 will end up as a non-urgent move. In other words, △ may look weak, but this is in appearance only. In truth it is far from weak. In short, Black has attacked a strong stone with 1, and this goes against the logic of go. If an attack is going to fail, it is better not to start the attack. Rather, one should hold back and reinforce one's own position.


It should be obvious now why Black took up position at 7 in Dia. 3. The important thing is the efficiency of the stones that one plays.



Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (The actual game)

Let us have a look at the continuation of this game. Black continued with 1 which naturally is a dubious move, the reason being that although White is forced to defend at 2, Black cannot avoid playing at 3 himself. This means that White can now aim at pulling out his $\triangle$ stone. In short, this gives him a chance to complicate the position by playing at 4. However, jumping to 4 is also a problem point. White's ambition in playing this move is to aim at attacking the left top corner, but this is overdoing things. When one's stones are in danger, there is no point in putting on a bold front. When Black plays 5, White is suddenly in trouble. Playing Black 5 at 'a' would also be good enough.




Problem 7

PROBLEM 7 WHITE TO PLAY

What should White think about when Black pushes at 1? This should be the turning point of the game for White.

Black is still left with the capture at 'a' so his group in the top left corner is strong. Therefore, trying to attack this group is impudence. What is called for here is positional judgement. This is what is meant by strength in the middle game. Rather than attacking, White should play in a way such that his own stones will not come under attack. This is what this position calls for.




Dia. 1

Dia. 1 (Is this the correct answer?)

What is one to say about White 1? It is not an extension, but it is not really a splitting play either. It creates a strange position. Well, we won't worry about what to call it since it looks like a good move. The fact is, this probing move shows correct judgement. It may not seem to be a very positive move, but this is not a position in which to play positively. In my opinion, this negative point is correct.

Dia. 2 (A wide open game)

Black 2 in answer to 1 is essential. White now has a nice sente move at 3. After Black plays 4, White switches



Dia. 2

to the splitting play at 5. This creates a wide open game. It splits the top and bottom star point stones completely, denying Black the chance to play the large-scale "centre game" which is the feature of the star point. This is the time that the 3-3 invasion, which is the main weakness of the star point, is emphasized.

White's stones at the top are not yet clearly settled, but he should have no trouble looking after them since he has a light shape there.

It may be too early to speak about who is leading, but clearly White now has hopes of winning. This shows that his positional judgement in choosing White 1 was correct.

Playing on a Large Scale

We have looked at various examples concerning the direction of play. To end up let us look at a game which consisted of heavy fighting from beginning to end.

If you play ambitiously you'll create a stir. If you play on a modest scale you'll get a modest result. This is what fighting is like. The essence of go is the clash of two opposing forces on the go board. This game was played between Kitani and myself (I had Black). It's quite an old game, but it has many examples of direction of play during fighting. Let us have a look at how to analyse the direction of play in a fight, and how to conduct the fighting.

As we have already seen the direction of play is most important in the opening. This is natural because the most efficient use of the stones must be made before they come into contact with each other.

Still, one cannot avoid the direction of play once the fighting begins. In fact, since the danger of damage is greater in a fight one could even say that the direction of play is more important in the middle game.

In any case, let us hope that you can master the direction of play during a fight by reading this chapter.





Figure 1 (1 - 7)

Fig. 1 A Special Strategy

Black 1 and 3 are a standard opening, but White is following a special strategy with 4 and 6. That is, it has taken Black two moves, 1 and 5, to settle the top right corner, but White is making do with just one move, White 4, to settle the bottom left corner.

In the other two corners the stones on the 3-4 points are opposed to each other. The usual thing to do would be for White to play an approach move in the lower right corner, but White is trying to make up for being one move behind with his special strategy. This is seen in the splitting play of White 6. It indicates that White has decided to play steadily because he has a komi. In any event, one cannot argue the merits of this splitting play.

Black next approached at 7.




Dia. 1

Let us consider Black's options at move 5.
Dia. 1 (Challenging basic principles)


A move like Black 1, playing on a large scale, is interesting. This is a challenge to the basic principles of fushi, that is, the importance of enclosing a corner. But I think that this kind of novel approach is conceivable. If White makes the splitting move at 2, Black presses at 3, then strikes at the shoulder of White 4 with 5. Black's aim is to dispense with the enclosing move at 'a'. However, White will not necessarily play 2 in answer to Black 1. There is no way of knowing what variations may lie in wait. Nonetheless, I think that this strategy is feasible.

Dia. 2 (The checking extension)

Enclosing the bottom right corner with 1 is a large move since this is also a checking extension and takes profit. However, White is certain to continue with 2 and



Dia. 2



Dia. 3

this harms the influence of the black corner enclosure at the top.

Since White has made his splitting play one line below the star point, in some cases Black may prefer to make his checking extension at 'a', thereby using the influence of his top corner enclosure. However, in this game he has kept the good point of 'a' in reserve. I think that all three of these approaches are instructive.

Dia. 3 (The high approach move)

Concerning the approach move in the upper left corner, if Black makes the high approach move at 1, the sequence up to the extension of 7 will follow, but in this position Black 7 is uninteresting, the reason being that since $\triangle$ is solidly located on the 3-3 point, the extension to 7 has no effect on it.

Black made the low approach move in the figure because he wanted to avoid this mediocre result.





Figure 2 (8 – 10)

Fig. 2 The Sparks Fly Quietly

Since Black did not enclose the bottom right corner, making the immediate approach move at 8 is natural. Black invades at 9 as a probe. White patiently answers by attaching underneath at 10. In just these three moves there are some important nuances. Both players are feeling each other out and trying to foil the other's strategy. Both are carefully paying attention to strategy and this is where the fascination of go is to be found. Of course, this explanation is not adequate in itself, so let us have a closer look at this sequence.




Dia. 4

Dia. 4 (What Black wants)

What Black is hoping for is the sequence to 3. You should note that the low solid move at 2 is the basis for making a checking extension at 'a'. In other words, Black's policy is to try to make the maximum use of his ▲ corner enclosure. Making a checking extension at 'a' will not gain anything if the black stones at the bottom right are weak. That is, because Black wants to play ambitiously at 'a', he is playing quietly at 2 at the bottom.

Common sense dictates that if one has a weak position in one place, one cannot fight strongly somewhere else. This is the reason Black plays low at 2.

Let us see what happens if he makes a high move.




Dia. 5

Dia. 5 (Joseki, but....)

Black 2 is a standard joseki move, but here it is not impressive. The checking extension at 'a' with the backing of the ▲ corner enclosure is still a good point, but now White can attack the black group from the outside at 'b' or attack its weak point at 'c' on the side. In other words, if Black tries to exploit the potential of his solitary stone within the white position by playing at 'a', there are bound to be harmful side effects on his stones at the bottom. Blindly following joseki by playing 2 is not the way to play living go.

In any case, in the sequence in the figure the key is the presence of the ▲ enclosure at the top. This enclosure is the main influence on the choice of moves by both sides.



Dia. 6

It is not enough just to make the corner enclosure and then to forget about these stones. One must try to realize the potential of these stones to the maximum – to keep on using this potential as long as possible.

There was a lot of depth to the three moves we have just been analysing. On the surface the position appeared calm, but actually sparks were flying.

The reason White avoided the joseki sequence was because he did not want to fall in with Black's plans. Playing patiently like this prevents Black from getting good shape at the bottom and also gives White the possibility of a counterattack. In other words, White was storing up his strength for later.

Black then switched elsewhere. He was content to regard this move, Black 9, as a forcing move.

Dia. 6 (The significance of a forcing move)

For example, when Black switches elsewhere, let us assume that White counterattacks with 1. Black pokes his head out with 2 and 4 and then himself counters by invading at 6. White, of course, will answer with 7. There is no reason in the world for him to attach at 'a'. However, in the figure White has attached at 'a', so you can see that Black 9 in the figure has been an effective forcing move. That is why Black was satisfied to switch elsewhere. This way of thinking is very important.




Figure 3 (11 – 14)

Figure 3 Point of Contact

Black switched to the top left corner with 11. White 12 and 14 are natural, but actually the hane of 13 is dubious. We will look at the reason in the next figure. In any case, however, the vital area of the game has switched to the top. Further, in relation to this, the situation at the bottom right is waiting to come to life.

Dia. 7 (Timing)


The hane of Black 1 was foremost in the minds of both players. What will happen when Black plays here and when will he get a chance to do so?

Dia. 8 (Forced)


If Black 1, the sequence to 7 is forced.

Dia. 9 (A favourable ladder for White)


The continuation from 8 to 12 is bad for Black. He can cut at 13, but White gets a favourable ladder with 14 because of $\triangle$ lying in wait at the top left. Black collapses.




Dia. 7




Dia. 8



Dia. 9



Dia. 10



Dia. 11

Let us assume that the ladder is unfavourable for White.

Dia. 10 (Tesuji)


Even in this case, White is not troubled. He has the tesuji of 3.

Dia. 11 (Continuation)


Black has no choice but to connect at 4. White then lives with 5, whereupon Black 6 is also forced. Black 8 forces White to secure life with 9 and he then crawls with 10.

Dia. 12 (Thickness for White)

White makes shape with 11, forcing Black to reinforce



Dia. 12



Dia. 13

with 12. He then extends at 13 building thickness in the centre. This is a good result for White. In other words, White does well regardless of whether the ladder is favourable or unfavourable. This means that the time has not yet come for Black to do anything on the bottom right side.

However, if there is a change in the overall position, Black may be able to aim at doing something here. The question of when this possibility emerges is an important point.

Dia. 13 (Out of the question)

Of course playing the hane at 1 is out of the question. When White plays 2 to 6, Black's failure is obvious.





Figure 4 (15 – 19)

Fig. 4 Struggling for Spheres of Influence


Black extends at 15, although the usual move here would be the diagonal connection at 17. He is prepared to let White cut at 16. Black's aim is the unorthodox strategy of Black 19. This makes use of the corner enclosure in the top right in order to expand Black's influence at the top. Let us have a close look at Black's approach here.



Dia. 14

Dia. 14 (Invasion)

Black 1 here is the ordinary move. If White 2, Black cannot omit the reinforcement at 3. White then invades at 4 and easily reduces Black's territory at the top. This result is painful for Black because he is open at the side at 'a'. White 4 is in almost no danger.




Dia. 15

Dia. 15 (Good)

What if Black had the tight small knight enclosure with ▲ at the top?

In this case the diagonal connection of Black 1 would be a good move since both ▲ and Black 1 are solid. Consequently, it is difficult for White to invade here.

A slight difference in the placement of one stone makes a big difference in the whole position.




Dia. 16

Dia. 16 (Unreasonable)

However, when Black has played ▲ as here, White's invasion at 1 is unreasonable. Black applies pressure with 2 and White is in trouble.

That is to say, the reason Black resorted to his unorthodox strategy was because he wanted to emphasize the top. This shows a correct understanding of the direction of play.


However, if one analyses the problem more carefully, it is necessary to go back a bit earlier.



Dia. 17

Dia. 17 (Correct)

Actually, when White made the contact play at 1, pulling back to 2 was the correct move. If White 3, Black defends at 4, leaving some potential for attacking the white group in the top left corner while giving Black the good answer of 6 when White invades at 5.




Dia. 18

Dia. 18 (Illogical)

To show why Black 2 in the preceding diagram was correct, look at this position.

Black obviously will not want to play at 4 after White has played 3. That is because when White plays 5, Black cannot omit 6. Now White has a chance to invade at 7 and he will have no trouble reducing the top area. To amplify this –



Dia. 19

Dia. 19 (Tewari)

If Black is going to hane at 2 and then defend at 4, it is better just to pull back at 4 at the outset. This diagram and Dia. 18 are exactly the same except that the order of 2 and 4 has been reversed. Both are bad for Black. That is, this tewari analysis shows that there is no reason for Black to play to the right of White 1. This is an important point, so it is worth careful consideration.




Figure 5 (20 – 30) 26: connects

Fig. 5 Emphasis on Outward Influence

Black naturally answers White 20 by blocking at 21.

Dia. 20 (Gote)

Connecting at 2 gives good potential, but this move is gote. The difference of a move at this stage of the game is vital.


Black 23 in the figure is a tesuji.

Dia. 21 (Bad potential)


Connecting at 2 may force White to defend at 3, thus keeping sente, but the presence of the White cut at 1 creates bad potential for Black.

Black 23 and 25 in the figure show an uncompromising emphasis on outward influence. White naturally connects at 26 leaving cutting points in Black's shape.


The diagonal connection at 27 is also worthy of some note.



Dia. 20



Dia. 21



Dia. 22

Having to answer 28 by connecting at 29 may seem insipid, but even the slightest increase in Black's strength at the top is worth it.

Dia. 22 (Omission)

Worrying about the cutting point and defending at Black 1 is bad. White captures with 2 and 4, and although Black gets solid thickness, White is able to omit the move at 'a'. It is extremely painful to lose sente like this. In the figure, Black is satisfied because White finally has to go back and defend at 30.





Figure 6 (31 – 32)

Fig. 6 Opening Hostilities

Black ended in sente at the top. White got profit and security, Black got outward influence. Black is left with some cutting points, but they are not serious defects. Defending these cutting points would be an excellent move, but Black sees this as his chance to go ahead with the hane of 31. The reason he can play at the bottom right now is that the position at the top has changed. Hostilities are opened here and this leads to some violent fighting.


White switches to 32 because he feels that meeting Black head on might be dangerous. This is an important strategic point. We are now approaching the key point of the middle game.



Dia. 23

Dia. 23 (The ladder)

Answering Black 1 with 2 is meeting Black's challenge head on. Playing this way was alright before, but things are different now that Black has so much thickness at the top. That is, Black is using this thickness as the basis for his challenge. If White cuts at 2, the same sequence to 7 follows as before. However, White is now unable to play 8 to 12. When Black escapes with 15, the ladder is no longer favourable for White.




Dia. 24

Dia. 24 (Fanning the flames)

Consequently, White has to play 10, which is the sequence for when the ladder is unfavourable. We have already studied this position. The sequence to 16 follows, but the difference from before is that Black can now increase the pressure on White by playing 17. This makes effective use of Black's thickness at the top and he seems to have good prospects for mounting a large-scale attack. Utilizing stones already played like this in an attack is the most effective way of playing.

Naturally, there is no question of the white group dying here; however, being attacked is bound to lead to some disadvantage. The above should make it clear why White switched to 32 in the figure. The significance of the pressing move is –



Dia. 25

Dia. 25 (White's aim)

If Black answers Δ at 1, White aims to cut at 2. After the sequence to 6, Δ is in just the right place to protect the cutting point.

The exchange of Δ for Black 1 is a bit of a minus for White, but as the old saying goes, 'you can't have it both ways'. The result to 6 is nonsensical for Black. He has just managed to live on the second line, but in exchange White has got central thickness. In other words, although a bit of a loss, Δ has served its purpose and White has managed to avoid the fighting that Black tried to start. Hence, Black is unlikely to answer Δ so submissively at 1.

Well, how should Black play then? What is called for here is a dash of fighting spirit, that crucial element in the game of go.




Figure 7 (33 – 37)

Fig. 7 Savage Fighting

Black connects at 33, ignoring White's last move. This shows real fighting spirit.

Dia. 26 (An exchange)

If White answers Black 1 with 2, Black continues with 3 and this exchange is favourable for Black. Therefore, White must play 34 in answer to 33. Next the turning move of 35 is the key point in this fight.


Dia. 27 (Bad for Black)

If Black simply plays 1, White answers at 2. Next, if Black 3, White 4. This result is bad for Black because White has a forcing move at 'a'.


After 36, Black switches to 37, the key point on the right side. This aims at connecting underneath. The fighting has become most furious.

Dia. 28 (Painful)


The set sequence of Black 1 and 3 only gives White the nice attacking move at 4. Black is in trouble.



Dia. 26



Dia. 27



Dia. 28




Figure 8 (38 – 45)


Fig. 8 Cautiously

At this stage every move involves an important decision as it is liable to have a direct bearing on the outcome. First let us look at White 38.


Dia. 29 (Breakthrough)

The capping move of White 1 does not work because Black breaks through with 2 and 4. White ends up with terrible shape.


Moving out with Black 39 looks natural, but thinking back on this position now –



Dia. 29



Dia. 30



Dia. 31


Dia. 30 (Sudden attack)

I now feel that attacking at 1 is better. If White plays 2, Black attaches at the vital point of 3 then extends at 5. White is in trouble. A sudden attack like this will make effective use of Black's thickness at the top.

Dia. 31 (The same)

If White answers 1 with the clamp of 2, Black extends with 3 and then attacks with 5. This is much the same – White is still in trouble and Black's thickness at the top is proving useful. In any case, it is obvious that Black 1 is the vital point.

Now, concerning White 'a' –




Dia. 32

Dia. 32 (A dud)


If White attacks with 1 and 3, Black counters with 4 making miai of 'a' and 'b'. White's bomb turns out to be a dud.

Dia. 33 (A large capture)

Consequently, White will defend with 1. However, Black protects against the cut by forcing with 2, then sets out to capture the whole white group with 4. This makes good use of Black's thickness at the top and White's distress is almost beyond description. Even if White somehow manages to live, Black will be able to build a solid wall on the outside. Moreover, the two black stones in the bottom right corner are not yet completely dead. Black can wait until after the fighting at the top is finished before worrying about getting life.



Dia. 33



Dia. 34

Dia. 34 (A fight)

Therefore, when Black plays 1, White has no choice but to escape with 2. Black then plays 3 and 5, thereby succeeding in playing on both sides. Moreover, he can face the coming fight with confidence. This is why I say that it would have been better for Black to have played like this.

Black 39 in the figure is only one line away, but this difference means that he has no severe attack on White.

White continued by attacking the corner at 40. His strategy is correct; there is no point in just submitting to attack. The black sequence from 41 to 45 is worth close consideration. When one gets involved in heavy fighting, it is dangerous just to think of safety and to try to make all one's groups live. One must adapt one's approach to the whole board, that is, sacrifice what should be sacrificed and take what should be taken.





Figure 9 (46 – 49)

Fig. 9 The Direction of Attack

Black extended at 47 sacrificing the bottom right corner. In return for his sacrifice here, Black was able to build thickness and he prepares for an all-out attack on the right side. Attacking at 49 is the correct direction.

Dia. 35 (No sense of direction)

Black 1 is a mistake in direction. Since Black is able to squeeze with 'a' in this position, he is very strong in this direction. Attacking from the direction in which one is strong goes against the logic of go. White attaches at 2 and lives easily. Next –



Dia. 35

Dia. 36

Dia. 36 (Profit)

If Black 2, White not only lives with 3 to 11, but takes a bit of profit also.

Black 49 in the figure is also played from the direction in which Black is thick, but nevertheless it is the correct way of attacking – Black's aim is to prevent White from settling himself, to chase him out into the centre and thus expand his position at the top. A proper sense of direction is very important when one is attacking. If one makes a mistake, one gains no profit from one's attack.




Figure 10 (50 – 57) 54: connects

Fig.10 The Vital Point of Attack

Escaping with White 50 is essential. Instead –


Dia. 37 (Living shape)

White 1 may look like the vital point, but Black lives neatly with 2 to 10. It is now apparent that White 10 is too slow-moving for escape. However, if White 50, Black now squeezes with 51 to 55, building thickness in sente. In this way, one alters one's play in accordance with the opponent's response. Next Black 57 is the vital point of attack. This move was Black's aim when he played ▲


These two moves combine to expand Black's area at the top.

An attack must be more than a simple attack. One must try to take some profit while attacking instead of just being content with the simple joy of attacking. This example shows how important the direction of attack is.


Note that defending at 56 is necessary. If omitted –



Dia. 37



Dia. 38



Dia. 39

Dia. 38 (Ko)

Black can play 1, setting up a ko with the sequence to 4.

Dia. 39 (The ko is unavoidable)

If White plays 4 and 6 in an attempt to capture outright and avoid ko, the peculiarity of the corner enables Black, on the contrary, to capture outright with 5 to 9.





Figure 11 (58 – 66)

Fig. 11 "I have won!"

White has no choice but to run out with 58. Thanks to ▲, Black can make two forcing moves at 59 and 61. Jumping next to 63 is the natural flow. Black has built up territory naturally while attacking because he correctly grasped the direction of attack. White 64 is the usual way to make a quick escape. Now Black solidly defends his defect with 65. This move amounts to a declaration that Black has won. However, Black is being too smug. The position does not yet entitle him to take it so easy. In fact, when White plays 66, the position is quite difficult. One might wonder whether White can afford to play 66 while he still has an



Dia. 40

unsettled group in the centre, but this is a resolute strategy staking the game on his ability to rescue the group in the centre. Moreover, White 66 does offer some assistance to the centre group. It is now apparent that before White got a chance to play 66 –

Dia. 40 (To strike a blow)

Black should have struck a blow at 1 with 55. If White 2, Black can keep on attacking at 3. This way things would not have been easy for White. Cutting at 4 at this stage would be pointless. Even if White moves out with 6, he has no continuation after Black 7.




Figure 12 (67 – 79) 77: takes ko


Fig. 12 Reckless

Black 67 is a large point which must be played. However, Black has now fallen a step behind. Because Black allowed White to play $\triangle$, he must now play passively at the bottom.

White now boldly counterattacks with 68. He now has the initiative: a tragedy for Black. Black's moment of timidity with $\blacktriangle$ has transformed the position.

Playing ko with 69 and 71 is the way to settle oneself here. Running out with a heavy group would be wrong. Capturing the ko with 77 is alright, but ignoring White's ko threat at 78 and playing 79 was reckless. The position now develops to Black's disadvantage.

Black 79 was played in a moment of madness. I became upset with my mistake and got desperate.




Dia. 41

Dia. 41 (Calmly)

If I had calmly played the hane at 1, I would have still had some hope. After White 6 –

Dia. 42 (Reasonable)

Black retakes with 7, forcing 8, and then plays 9. If White 10, Black splits White with 11 aiming at an attack beginning with a peep at 'c' setting up a large-scale attack in the centre. This position would have been reasonable for Black.



Dia. 42

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


Figure 13 (80 - 94)

Fig. 13 *Losing*

White 80 is an all important ko. Ko threats like Black 81 are just not good enough. White simply captures at 82.

Black's profit in the lower left corner is not to be taken lightly but White is still left with a move in the top right corner at 84, so this whole exchange is unfavourable for Black. White lives in sente from 86 to 90, then reinforces in the centre with 92. In effect there has been an exchange of the top right for the bottom left. If Black did not play 93, he would only be leaving trouble for later here, but then White runs at 94 and Black's prime territory disappears. Black has lost.

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